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Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton* and Emily Michiko Morris** 
Abstract: Although all should be treated equally under the law, patent law has long been 
known to favor some less than others. Patentable technology is highly heterogeneous, covering 
everything from minute improvements in electronics to pioneering new artificial organs, but 
patent protection itself is purely a one-size-fits-all system. Patents thus overreward some while 
underrewarding others. On the one hand, patents overreward low-investment, low-value 
inventions by granting them the same twenty-year term of protection as those that required 
much higher investments and yield much higher social value. The resulting glut of low-quality 
patents has contributed greatly to the “patent crisis” of opportunistic “patent trolls,” heightened 
transaction costs, and costly litigation that have ultimately stalled innovation. On the other 
hand, patents also underreward in two significant ways. First, patents often fail to give some 
high-investment, high-value inventions enough protection. Second, many inventors are shut 
out from patent protection altogether if they lack the resources necessary to navigate the patent 
system’s costly, complex, and frequently biased examination process. This latter phenomenon 
disproportionately affects female and minority inventors, among others, thereby creating 
significant distributive effects. 
This Article argues that both of these effects—the overprotection of low-value inventions 
and the underprotection of inventions by women and minorities—could be alleviated by 
altering one particular but seldom-appreciated aspect of the patent system’s one-size-fits-all 
approach: its registration-only design. Copyright and trademark law allow for both registered 
and unregistered rights, but the patent system grants rights only to those who register their 
inventions and undergo subsequent examination. If the patent system were to follow the two-
tiered approach of copyright and trademark law, however, and implement a regime of 
automatic but very limited unregistered rights in addition to registered rights, it could help 
address both problems. First, providing a much lower-cost alternative for obtaining protection, 
such a two-tiered regime could, with varying degrees of aggressiveness, channel low-
investment, low-value inventions away from the system-clogging overprotections of the full, 
twenty-year, broad rights currently granted to registered patents. Second, as the authors of this 
Article have previously argued, by providing automatic rights without having to go through 
the resource-intensive registration and examination process, unregistered patent protection 
could help women and other disadvantaged inventors gain greater access to patent protections. 
Maintaining a two-tiered regime of both registered and unregistered patent rights thus offers a 
promising way to mitigate the inefficiencies of the current system by attenuating certain 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law is generally seen as most efficient when it incentivizes beneficial 
behavior and disincentivizes harmful behavior. Patent law, for example, 
is designed to encourage technological innovation1 by granting qualified 
inventors the exclusive rights to make, use, sell, or license their inventions 
against all others for a period of twenty years.2 This rather robust, if 
relatively brief, exclusivity is thought to incentivize investment in 
innovation by giving inventors the potential to earn supracompetitive 
returns.3 Yet, the patent system has been under fire in the last few decades 
for stifling innovation by both overprotecting some inventions and 
 
1. As allowed under the so-called IP clause of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
(granting Congress the enumerated power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings 
and Discoveries”). 
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. 2012). 
3. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 168–71 (2005); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post 
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2004). 
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underprotecting others.4 
Most critics blame this on the one-size-fits-all nature of the patent 
system, in which all inventions receive the same rights for the same length 
of time, regardless of the nature of the underlying technology, the 
magnitude of investment necessary to achieve it, or the overall social 
value that it creates.5 A previously unappreciated fact, however, is that 
these problems stem from more than just the patent system’s failure to 
tailor rights or duration. It is also the patent system’s inflexibility as to 
how those rights are acquired that causes problems of both under- and 
overprotection. The patent system grants rights only through registration 
(application) and examination. This means that, on the one hand, the 
patent system gives inventors only one choice—either forgo protection 
altogether or invest significant resources in going through the patent 
examination process. For many inventors this is in practice no choice at 
all, as the patent system’s costly, complex, and frequently biased 
examination process hampers their ability to obtain patent protections, 
regardless of the value of their inventions. On the other hand, the patent 
system grants the same twenty years of robust rights to all inventions, 
regardless of how much protection those inventions actually merit or 
need, often leading to an excess of patent rights that serve more to hamper 
than to facilitate technological progress. 
The patent system is an outlier among intellectual property (IP) regimes 
in granting only registered rights, however. Both copyright law and 
trademark law accord unregistered as well as registered rights and vary 
the protections allowed under each. If the patent system were to adopt a 
similarly two-tiered regime, it would put the patent system in line with the 
longstanding approaches taken in both copyright and trademark law. More 
importantly, such a relatively simple modification to the patent system 
would also furnish it with a very useful tool, both for avoiding 
overprotection of inventions of marginal value and for avoiding 
underprotection of inventions by those for whom registration and 
examination is an undue burden. 
The most obvious way in which a two-tiered regime would assuage the 
inflexibilities of the patent system is by providing unregistered rights for 
inventors who might otherwise be unable to obtain them. Access to patent 
protection is not equal. Empirical research has repeatedly shown that 
specific groups such as women, racial and ethnic minorities, and 
 
4. See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 2 (2008); Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Patent Rights in a 
Climate of Intellectual Property Rights Skepticism, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 110–11 (2016). 
5. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 
3–4, 136–37 (2009). 
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entrepreneurs are consistently underrepresented among patentees.6 For 
example, women file patent applications at disproportionately lower rates 
than men, even when controlling for male-to-female ratios and other 
variables among inventors.7 Racial and ethnic minorities show a similarly 
disproportionate gap in patent applications filed.8 As the authors have 
previously shown elsewhere, this is in large part because simply filing a 
patent application can require tens of thousands of dollars, years of time, 
and in-depth knowledge of the patent system.9 On average, however, 
female and minority inventors have less access to the kind of funding, 
networks, and other support structures critical to navigating the patenting 
process.10 Moreover, studies show that women and minorities also face 
inherent biases in the examination process.11 Recent studies indicate that 
patent applications filed by women and certain ethnic and racial minorities 
are more likely to be rejected than those by white male applicants and, 
 
6. See Dana Kanze, Laura Huang, Mark A. Conley & E. Tory Higgins, We Ask Men to Win 
and Women Not to Lose: Closing the Gender Gap in Startup Funding , 61 ACAD. MGMT. J. 586, 
586 (2018); JESSICA MILLI, EMMA WILLIAMS-BARON, MEIKA BERLAN, JENNY XIA & 
BARBARA GAULT, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RSCH., EQUITY IN INNOVATION: WOMEN 
INVENTORS  AND  PATENTS  3–8,  11–12  (2016),  https://iwpr.org/wpcontent/uploads/wpallimport/ 
files/iwprexport/publications/C448%20Equity%20in%20Innovation.pdf  [https://perma.cc/6ZDA-
UUFV]; see also BERNA DEMIRALP, LAURA MORRISON & STEPHANIE ZAYED, NAT’L WOMEN’S BUS. 
COUNCIL, ON THE COMMERCIALIZATION PATH: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
OUTPUTS AMONG WOMEN IN STEM 22–24 (2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/nwbc-
prod.sba.fun/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/13133831/STEM-Commercialization-website-ready.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5P8V-PMMW]. 
7. Gema Lax Martinez, Julio Raffo & Kaori Saito, Identifying the Gender of PCT Inventors 8 
(Econ. & Stat. Series, Econ. Rsch. Working Paper No. 33, 2016); Waverly W. Ding, Fiona Murray & 
Toby E. Stewart, Gender Differences in Patenting in the Academic Life Sciences, 313 SCI. 665, 665 
(2006); Kjersten Bunker Whittington, Mothers of Invention? Gender, Motherhood, and New 
Dimensions of Productivity in the Science Profession, 38 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 417, 418–20 
(2011); Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel Smith-Doerr, Women Inventors in Context: 
Disparities in Patenting Across Academia and Industry, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 194, 203–07 (2008). 
8. W. Michael Schuster, R. Evan Davis, Kourtenay Schley & Julie Ravenscraft, An Empirical Study 
of Patent Grant Rates as a Function of Race and Gender, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 281, 317–18 (2020) (“Our 
analysis of more than 3.9 million patent applications provides evidence that patents are not equally 
available to some segments of society. Both women and minority inventors are less likely to have 
their patent applications granted.”). 
9. Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton & Emily Michiko Morris, The Distributive Effects of IP Registration, 
23 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 306, 345–47, 356–58 (2020). 
10. ALICIA ROBB, ACCESS TO CAPITAL AMONG YOUNG FIRMS, MINORITY-OWNED FIRMS, 
WOMEN-OWNED  FIRMS,  AND  HIGH-TECH  FIRMS  31  (2013),  https://www.sba.gov/sites/ 
default/files/files/rs403tot(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/MN2B-RGF3]; Paula E. Stephan & Asmaa El-
Ganainy, The Entrepreneurial Puzzle: Explaining the Gender Gap, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 475, 481 
(2007); Ding et al., supra note 7, at 666. 
11. Kyle Jensen, Balázs Kovács & Olav Sorenson, Gender Differences in Obtaining and 
Maintaining Patent Rights, 36 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 307, 307 (2018); Schuster et. al., supra note 
8, at 317–18. 
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even if not rejected, are more likely to be narrowed in scope.12 If women, 
minorities, and other disadvantaged inventors did not have to go through 
the application and examination process—that is, if patent protections 
were automatic and did not require registration—inventors could avoid 
the costs and biases of patent registration, and the gender and racial 
disparities in patenting would be significantly narrowed. 
Second, and less obvious, unregistered patent rights would also 
alleviate the rigidity of the current patent system by reducing 
overprotection of inventions. When the patent system underprotects 
inventions, it fails to provide adequate incentives to invest in research and 
development (R&D).13 When patents provide more protection than is 
needed, on the other hand, patent protection can be destructive by 
hindering downstream innovation.14 Such problems are most likely to 
arise when patents cover relatively small improvements that have little 
value by themselves but are instead most useful in coordination with other 
cumulative or complementary existing technologies.15 The result is often 
a “thicket” of too many highly fragmented and yet overlapping patent 
rights belonging to too many different entities, all of whom have the same 
rights to block all of the others from combining their respective 
technologies into a single, marketable whole. This in turn decreases 
commercialization and development of these technologies, to the 
detriment of not only the patent owners but also the public.16 
Furthermore, the issue of overprotection under the existing patent 
system relates to the more general problem of low-quality patents.17 Low-
quality patents are those that cover technological developments requiring 
little to no R&D investment, often yielding negligible social or 
technological value.18 Note that this Article refers to the “value” or 
“quality” of an invention as defined by its social or technological value, 
not its economic value. The economic value of an invention is greatly 
 
12. See Schuster et al., supra note 8. 
13. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 204 n.1. 
14. See Maayan Perel, Reviving the Gatekeeping Function: Optimizing the Exclusion Potential of 
Subject Matter Eligibility, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 237, 287–88 (2013). 
15. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 78. 
16. See Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard 
Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 119, 121–22 (2000). 
17. See generally R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
2135, 2140–41 (2009) (discussing the problems created by low patent quality). 
18. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (noting that patent system was not 
designed to protect innovations that contribute little to the art); Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, 
Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System-Design Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 989, 991 (2004) (“[H]igh quality patents describe inventions that are truly new, rather than 
inventions that are already in widespread use but not yet patented.”). 
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influenced by any patent rights attached to it, but patent rights are exactly 
the variable that this Article proposes to alter. Some low-quality patents 
are issued by mistake, but many are simply a result of the inability of the 
current patent system to screen out inventions that do not need or merit 
full patent protections.19 For example, many scholars have suggested that 
low-quality patents are particularly common among business-method and 
software patents, both areas in which patent quality is hotly debated.20 
Because low-quality patents offer the same level of protection as high-
quality patents under the current system, however, patent owners have the 
power to interfere with the innovative activity of others, even when they 
themselves made little to no scientific contribution.21 Low-quality and 
low-value patents also create problems by giving leverage to “patent 
trolls,”22 who generate revenues not through invention or 
commercialization but through aggressive patent litigation and licensing 
techniques to extract rents from those who do.23 Such practices serve only 
to divert investment from R&D and thus obstruct rather than stimulate 
innovation and technological progress.24 The overabundance of low-
quality and low-value patents and their concomitant problems with rights 
coordination and patent trolling have led to what many term a “patent 
crisis” or “patent failure,”25 with significant costs for patentees, 
innovation, and society at large.26 
In a two-tiered patent regime, however, many of these low-investment, 
low-value inventions could be channeled into unregistered protections. At 
first glance, this might seem to accomplish little, but the virtue of 
unregistered patent rights is they could provide an alternative in terms of 
both duration and rights provided. The authors of this Article have 
previously proposed one such alternative: unregistered patent rights that, 
while relying on the same patentability requirements as registered rights, 
 
19. See Wagner, supra note 17, at 2141. 
20. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 187–214 (discussing software and business 
method patents). 
21. Id. at 159–60. 
22. See generally John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz, How Often Do Non-
Practicing Entities Win Patent Suits?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 237, 242–44 (2017) (discussing 
patent trolling); Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2146–66 (2013) (same). 
23. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 22, at 2163–65. But see David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, 
Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 444 
(2014) (suggesting that nonpracticing entities may support markets for patent rights). 
24. See Wagner, supra note 17, at 2140–41.  
25. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 2–24; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 1. 
26. See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 46–72, 147–64; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5,  
at 3–6. 
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last for only three years. More importantly, such rights would provide the 
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or offering to sell only 
direct copies of the protected invention, not independent creations.27 In 
this way, unregistered patent rights would not only set a meaningful limit 
on those that have not been vetted through the examination process but 
also permit some  rough tailoring of patent protections. Because 
unregistered rights like these would be considerably limited in both 
duration and reach, they are significantly less burdensome on others than 
the much fuller and longer protections offered under registered rights. To 
the extent that inventors of minimally inventive or low-value works can 
be encouraged to settle for unregistered rights rather than registered ones, 
then, it would reduce the overall patent load in cumulative or 
complementary technologies and thus ease patent thickets and other 
problems in coordinating rights. 
In a minority of cases, inventors would voluntarily forgo the much 
greater protections of registered rights for the much less costly protections 
of unregistered ones. For example, unregistered patent rights may be 
particularly attractive in technologies that have fast development cycles 
and high obsolescence rates, such as computer software and some 
electronics. In these fields, the profitable life of new innovations is brief 
and often gone before the examination process for registered patent rights 
can be completed. Unregistered patent rights, by contrast, would attach 
automatically, without cost or delay, and provide more meaningful 
protections for such short-lived innovations. Unregistered patent 
protections could be attractive for low-investment and low-value 
inventions as well, where three years of immediate albeit limited 
protections would easily be sufficient to recoup R&D costs as well as 
some profit, particularly in light of the fact that the protections come at no 
cost. But, as is evident from the crisis seen under the current patent 
system, many would still find it in their interests to invest in obtaining full 
registered rights in hopes of extracting more rents through aggressive 
licensing or litigation. To relieve the glut of this latter type of low-quality 
and low-value patenting, the patent system would need other, more 
aggressive measures to encourage owners of such inventions to choose 
unregistered rights over registered ones. 
This Article therefore proposes a number of “sticks” that could be used 
to push inventors to choose unregistered rights over registered ones when 
their R&D investments do not meet some minimum threshold level. These 
sticks include higher filing fees, terminal disclaimers of some part of their 
 
27. Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton, Yotam Kaplan & Emily Michiko Morris, Unregistered Patents & 
Gender Equality, 43 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 47, 73–88 (2020). 
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patent terms, or even disqualification from patent eligibility. Similar 
measures also could be imposed on nonpracticing patent owners who do 
not license their patents in good faith. 
The analysis here advances the bold idea of introducing unregistered 
patents as a way to mitigate the ills of the current patent system, whose 
one-size-fits-all approach often results in either overprotection or 
underprotection by providing the same level of protection without regard 
to the great differences in the levels of investment that different inventions 
require. While the authors recognize the value of registering patent rights 
and do not call for the abolition of the current regime, the establishment 
of an unregistered patent regime would offset some of the drawbacks of 
registration. The automatic grant of limited patent rights without the need 
for registration would bypass bias during the registration process and 
reduce other inequities affecting access to patent protection. Such a 
scheme would also provide a more appropriate level of protection to low-
value and low-investment inventions. Therefore, the patent system must 
consider the role of unregistered patent rights and incorporate their use in 
tandem with registered patent rights. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview of the 
two-tiered regimes in copyright and trademarks, which unlike patent law 
offer both registered and unregistered routes of protection. This Part also 
discusses the justifications for registering IP rights. Part II then examines 
the current patent crisis on the one hand and the inequities and possible 
distributive effects arising from patent registration regimes, on the other 
hand, highlighting the various gender, racial, ethnic, and socio-economic 
gaps in patent protection. While the academic literature on registration of 
IP rights consistently focuses on its economic benefits, the patent regime’s 
one-size-fits-all approach introduces significant costs by incentivizing the 
filing of patent applications on low-value and low-investment inventions, 
thereby raising the overall cost of innovation. Moreover, the inequities 
that arise from the registration process have long been overlooked in 
patent rights, and these costs create significant drags on equitable access 
to protection. 
Part III introduces a proposal to mitigate both of these negative effects 
through the introduction of an unregistered patent regime. While 
registration should not be disincentivized, introduction of unregistered 
patents could offer a useful route to handling many of the negative side 
effects of the patent system. Although the rights granted under the 
proposed unregistered patent regime would be much less robust than those 
under the existing registered patent system, the unregistered patent rights 
would at least provide some measure of protection for inventors who are 
disadvantaged by the existing registration system. By the same token, the 
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carefully constrained design of the proposed unregistered rights could also 
reduce the power of rights holders who are arguably overly advantaged 
by the existing one-size-fits-all registered patent regime, particularly 
when combined with measures to drive these rights holders toward 
unregistered rights. In other words, the proposed model could mitigate the 
proliferation of patent rights on low-value, low-investment inventions by 
channeling these inventions toward narrower, much shorter-lived 
unregistered patents. 
I. REGISTERED AND UNREGISTERED IP REGIMES 
People have asserted and protected property rights under the law long 
before systems to register those rights existed. Even now, registration is 
not necessary to protect many types of property and other rights. For 
example, one need not register rights in every piece of personal property 
one owns. Nevertheless, registration of rights, particularly property rights, 
has become common. 
Comparing the effect of registration in securing rights to the grant of 
rights without registration is particularly apropos in the field of IP rights, 
where protection is often granted both with and without registration. Both 
copyright and trademark law in the United States employ such a two-
tiered approach: protection is automatic for all works that meet the 
requisite criteria, but protection can also be secured through registration.28 
A notable exception to this pattern is patent law, which does not employ 
a two-tiered approach and mandates registration and examination in order 
to receive protection.29 Examining the theory behind registration of IP 
rights, as well as how specifically registration is used in each type of IP, 
shows that registration is heavily favored. Even in two-tiered regimes like 
copyright and trademark, registration yields advantages that unregistered 
rights do not. This disparity in protection between registered and 
unregistered rights thus has obvious implications, as discussed in Part II. 
A. The Theory Behind Registration 
The benefits of registration clearly demonstrate why copyright, 
trademark, and patent law all employ a registered rights approach. 
Registration serves an important public-notice function providing all with 
 
28. Industrial design protection in the European Union and other jurisdictions also employs the 
two-tiered registered and unregistered rights approach. This Article, however, focuses solely on 
U.S. law. 
29. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (discussing patent application); id. §§ 131–135 (discussing patent 
examination).  
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information on who owns what rights.30 This saves both rights owners and 
potential infringers the costs of having to communicate with each other 
about the boundaries of those rights, which in turn lowers both 
enforcement and clearance costs.31 Registration also enhances the 
marketability of IP rights by verifying for buyers both the nature of the 
asset at issue and the seller’s claim of ownership of it, thus reducing 
transaction costs.32 Registration furthermore enables sellers to transfer 
only partial rights, such as security interests or leaseholds, by allowing 
them to designate ownership without regard to physical possession.33 
Owners who register their assets also can more easily prove their 
ownership rights against fraudulent third-party claims of ownership and 
identify, locate, and recover assets that have been stolen, lost, or 
poorly transferred.34 
In addition, registration systems that require substantive examination, 
such as patent law, provide assurances that the rights granted are 
warranted and valid. This may increase the value of the rights by signaling 
not only legitimacy of the rights themselves but also that of their owner. 
Registration and examination also can help settle conflicting claims by 
giving priority to the first to register, the first to use, the first to create or 
possess, and so on, while simultaneously giving everyone else notice not 
to waste resources on reproducing what has already been claimed. The 
registration and examination process can elicit disclosures of information 
that might otherwise be kept as trade secrets.35 These disclosures also 
assist in cross-sectional and longitudinal studies on rights registered and 
who owns them.36 Failure to register one’s IP rights, on the other hand, 
can be interpreted as dedication to the public or abandonment, thus 
reducing the number of ownership claims. Registration fees and other 
costs likewise can help deter claims to low-value creations or other assets. 
 
30. Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 303–04 (1984). 
31. Id.  
32. Benito Arruñada, Registries, 1 MAN & ECON. 209, 211 (2014); Abraham Bell & Gideon 
Parchomovsky, Of Property and Information, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 241–42 (2016).  
33. Baird & Jackson, supra note 30, at 304–05. 
34. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 32, at 241–42. 
35. Indeed, in the patent system rights are said to be based on a “patent bargain” quid pro quo—
full disclosure of technical information in exchange for property rights—as a way of enhancing the 
public’s fund of technological and scientific knowledge. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 111–114 (discussing the 
patent application disclosure requirements). 
36. See, for example, Schuster et al., supra note 8, and Robert Brauneis & Dotan Oliar, An 
Empirical Study of the Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age of Copyright Registrants, 86 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 46 (2018), for two major studies on trademark and copyright registration, respectively. Much 
of the value of this data also can be seen below in the discussion on the distributive effects of 
patent registration. 
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Intellectual property, which involves creations that are not only new 
but also intangible, particularly benefits from registration. The general 
lack of physically visible boundaries makes registration an important 
means of providing public notice of the claimed property right. 
Trademark, copyright, and patent law all employ registration to varying 
degrees, however. 
B. Trademark 
Trademark law employs a two-tiered approach by offering both 
registered and unregistered rights but varying the protections provided, 
particularly with regard to available remedies for infringement. 
Trademark law protects words, logos, package designs, and combinations 
thereof that are used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify its goods 
or services and distinguish them from others.37 Trademarks thus include 
brand names,38 service marks,39 certification marks,40 and collective 
marks.41 Owners can claim rights over their marks by registering them 
with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), but simply 
being the first to use a sufficiently distinctive mark “in commerce” on or 
in connection with goods or services allows the user to acquire rights 
automatically within the geographic area of use, even if someone else 
subsequently tries to register rights in the same mark.42 
Registration nonetheless offers a number of advantages.43 Federal 
registration provides protection nationwide, regardless of how extensively 
 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; see also Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118–19 (1938); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 9 (AM. L. INST. 1995). 
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 U.S. 143, 145–46 (1920). 
39. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (service marks are “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish the services of one person, including a 
unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that 
source is unknown”). 
40. Id. (certification marks are “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof . . . used by a person . . . to certify regional or other origin, material, mode of manufacture, 
quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of such person’s goods or services or that the work or labor 
on the goods or services was performed by members of a union or other organization”). 
41. Id. (collective marks are marks “used by the members of a cooperative, an association, or other 
collective group or organization . . . and includes marks indicating membership in a union, an 
association, or other organization”); see also Procter & Gamble Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 485 
F. Supp. 1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 636 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir. 1980). 
42. See Nat’l Ass’n for Healthcare Commc’ns, Inc. v. Cent. Ark. Area Agency on Aging, Inc., 257 
F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2001); Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1193–200 
(11th Cir. 2001); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining “use in commerce”).  
43. BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW 250–52 (7th ed. 2020); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057, 1065, 
1072 (enumerating benefits of registration). 
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the mark is actually being used.44 Mark owners can also register their 
marks with individual states, but this protects the mark only within that 
particular state45 and can be superseded by subsequent federal 
registration.46 Moreover, remedies such as disgorgement of profits,47 
damages for past infringement,48 litigation costs,49 and attorneys’ fees are 
limited to federally registered marks50 whose infringers had actual notice 
of the federal registration.51 
Otherwise, both registered and unregistered trademarks enjoy the same 
protections. Protections for both last as long as the marks continue to meet 
the requisite standards for use in commerce and distinctiveness,52 
although owners of federally registered marks also must take some 
additional steps, such as periodically certifying that continued use.53 Both 
registered and unregistered marks can be licensed54 or assigned55 under 
specific circumstances, and federal and state trademark law protect both 
registered and unregistered marks56 against infringement by identical or 
confusingly similar marks on identical or closely related goods or services 
within the protected geographical area.57 Both registered and unregistered 
marks enjoy the right to injunctive relief against future infringement under 
federal and most state laws,58 although this relief is limited. Some states 
even have criminal penalties for certain forms of 
 
44. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1057(c).  
45. See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 22:1 (5th ed. 2020). 
46. Id. § 22:2 (“[I]f state law were to give a state registrant exclusive rights throughout a state, such 
a result could be preempted by the federal Lanham Act, which limits the non-registrant to the exact 
territory of continuous pre-registration usage.”). 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 
48. Id.; Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1125–27 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 
505 U.S. 763 (1992). Damages for past infringement can also be trebled in cases of willful 
infringement. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b). 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1114. 
50. Id.; Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats Co., 34 F.3d 1340, 1347 (7th Cir. 1994). 
51. 15 U.S.C. § 1111. 
52. Id. § 1064; Saratoga Vichy Spring Co. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1043 (2d Cir. 1980). 
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058–1059. 
54. Id. § 1127; Clark & Freeman Corp. v. Heartland Co., 811 F. Supp. 137, 139–40 (S.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1060; see Yocum v. Covington, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 210, 212–13 (T.T.A.B. 1982). 
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
57. Id.; Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 820 (1961).  
58. 15 U.S.C. § 53; Church of Scientology Int’l v. Elmira Mission of the Church of Scientology, 
794 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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trademark infringement.59 
The rationale behind trademark’s two-tiered system is unclear. 
Trademark-like indications have been used for centuries.60 In medieval 
England, for example, professional guilds and even some towns adopted 
symbols that artisans were required to use on their goods to show that they 
met established quality standards.61 Protection and regulation of these 
symbols were highly decentralized and variable, and whether the symbols 
had to be registered with a particular authority depended on the guild, 
locality, or town at issue.62 Much later, after trademarks came to be seen 
less as regulatory marks and more as protectible designations of origin, 
nineteenth century English and American courts interpreted this medieval 
history as showing that trademarks were protectible as common-law 
rights.63 As trademarks continued to grow in value, national registries 
were established to provide more certainty over the ownership and 
geographic scope of rights.64 State courts in the U.S. continued to protect 
trademarks as common-law rights, however, with federal courts 
eventually following suit,65 presumably to protect settled expectations. 
Trademark law nonetheless created an increasing number of advantages 
to registration, such as nationwide priority, to incentivize registration.66 
The benefits of continuing to protect unregistered trademark rights, on the 
other hand, have gone unremarked. 
C. Copyright 
Although many other countries employ only a single-tiered, 
unregistered-rights-only approach to copyright protection, copyright law 
 
59. See Jeremy M. Wilson, Brandon A. Sullivan, Travis Johnson, Roy Fenoff & Kari Kammel, 
Product Counterfeiting Legislation in the United States: A Review and Assessment of Characteristics, 
Remedies, and Penalties, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 543–60 (2016).   
60. FRANK L. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-
MARKS 19–20 (Munroe Smith et al. eds., 1925). 
61. Id. at 42–63 (describing English practices starting in the fourteenth century). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 9–10, 123–24, 152–53; David E. Missirian, The Death of Moral Freedom: How the 
Trademark Dilution Act Has Allowed Federal Courts to Punish Subjectively-Defined Immoral 
Secondary Use of Trademarks, 18 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 396, 398 (2019).  
64. SCHECHTER, supra note 60, at 134 (noting how registration increased with increase of 
importance of trademarks); 10 CONG. REC. H2799 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1880) (statement of H. Rep. 
M.A. McCoid); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4821 (1870) (Senate voting against striking 
proposal in House bill to allow registration of trademark rights). 
65. J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant Is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 51–54 (1996). 
66. Deborah R. Gerhardt & Jon P. McClanahan, Do Trademark Lawyers Matter?, 16 STAN. TECH. 
L. REV. 583, 587 (2013). 
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in the U.S. and several other countries employs a two-tiered approach of 
both registered and unregistered protection of works, similar to that in 
trademark law.67 Copyrights are said to protect the “writings” of 
“authors,”68 but this actually includes written works, pictorial and 
sculptural works, audiovisual works, sound recordings, computer 
programs, and even architectural works.69 Copyright covers only the 
particular expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves,70 but otherwise 
the standards are simple: a work need only be “original” and fixed in a 
tangible medium to be protectable.71 Moreover, protection is quite long-
lived: works created on or after January 1, 1978, for example, are 
protected for the remainder of the authors’ lifetimes plus another 
seventy years.72 
Despite the availability of registration, the vast majority of works are 
unregistered. The moment a (minimally) original work is fixed in a 
tangible form, it automatically enjoys federal copyright protection.73 No 
copyright notice is required,74 although owners may affix a statutory 
copyright notice to all publicly distributed copies of their works.75 
Protection automatically grants the exclusive right to reproduce, 
distribute, publicly display and perform, and make derivatives from their 
works, and for some fine artworks, authors also have the right to 
 
67. There is an ongoing debate over the merits of automatic ownership rights to one’s own 
expressive works versus the merits of public registration of such rights, however. See LAWRENCE 
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN 
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 287–91 (2004); Stef van Gompel, Formalities in the Digital 
Era: An Obstacle or Opportunity?, in GLOBAL COPYRIGHT: THREE HUNDRED YEARS SINCE THE 
STATUTE OF ANNE, FROM 1709 TO CYBERSPACE 398–99 (L. Bently et al. eds., 2010); Niva Elkin-
Koren, Can Formalities Save the Public Domain? Reconsidering Formalities for the 2010s, 28 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1537, 1538–41 (2013); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 167, 168–73 (2005); Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, 
2007 UTAH L. REV. 551, 562–63; Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 485, 486–91 (2004); Daniel Gervais & Dashiell Renaud, The Future of United States Copyright 
Formalities: Why We Should Prioritize Recordation, and How to Do It, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1459, 1460–66 (2013). 
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 
COLUM. L. REV. 503, 506–11 (1945); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325–33, 344–46 (1989). 
69. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
70. Id. § 102(b); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879). 
71. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); 
BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 45–46 (1967). 
72. 17 U.S.C. § 302; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 133–36 (1976).  
73. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52–53. 
74. 17 U.S.C. § 401(a). 
75. Id. § 401.  
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attribution or modification.76 Copyright protections are, in many ways, 
narrower than in trademark or patent law, however. Independent creation 
is an absolute defense to claims of infringement, and actual copying is 
often difficult to prove.77 Federal law in the U.S. also contains many 
detailed safe harbors, such as “fair use” of a work for “transformative” 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, and research.78 
That being said, the U.S. did not grant unregistered, automatic 
protections until 1978,79 and even now, unregistered works receive less 
protection than registered ones. For example, registration creates a 
presumption of validity of the copyright on a work80 and is thus a 
prerequisite for initiating infringement suits for works of U.S. origin.81 
Current law also allows statutory damages and attorneys’ fees only for 
infringement occurring after registration82 and bars non-willful 
infringement defenses for marked works.83 Likewise, recordation of 
transfers creates a presumption of constructive notice but is not a 
prerequisite to an infringement action or a limit on infringement 
damages.84 The division between registered and unregistered copyright 
rights thus resembles that seen in trademark law. 
The history of copyright protections is slightly more complex than that 
of trademark protections. Although rights to print a work in Elizabethan 
England had to be registered with a printing guild, authors’ rights to their 
works often were contended to arise under common law and last into 
perpetuity without the need for registration.85 Thus, as with trademark 
 
76. Id. §§ 106, 106A. 
77. See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74–75 (2d Cir. 1997) (explaining 
plaintiffs’ frequent need to rely on similarity plus access as indirect proof of copying); Alan Latman, 
“Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright 
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188–99 (1990) (same).  
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
79. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 408; see Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary 
and Artistic Works art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, amended Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 1161 U.N.T.S. 
3 [hereinafter Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works]. 
80. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). 
81. Id. § 411. There is no registration prerequisite in order to bring suit for infringement of a work 
of foreign origin. See U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Pats., Copyrights, & Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 480–81 (1987). 
82. 17 U.S.C. § 412. 
83. See id. § 401(d). 
84. Id. § 205(c). The law continues to require deposit but punishes failure to comply with a fine 
rather than with forfeiture of the copyright. Id. § 407(d). 
85. Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright Clause, 
84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 909, 916–17 (2002) (discussing Millar v. Taylor (1769) 98 
Eng. Rep. 201 (KB)). 
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rights, copyrights were originally protected without registration. 
Copyright registration was created only later to record the content and 
date of a protectable work and to limit what otherwise would have been a 
perpetual common-law monopoly over the protected work.86 
United States federal law introduced such unregistered rights into its 
own copyright regime only after 1978 when it had finally acceded to the 
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
(Berne Convention).87 Before 1978, U.S. federal copyright protection 
required publication with notice, deposit of a copy of the work with the 
register of copyright, and registration,88 but both the Berne Convention 
and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS Agreement)89 now prohibit the U.S. and other signatory countries 
from imposing formalities as a condition for protection.90 Indeed, the 
Berne Convention developed over several decades not only to enhance 
copyright protections but also to make them more uniformly and easily 
obtainable, especially for foreign authors or others who might not be fully 
aware of a particular country’s domestic copyright provisions.91 This 
reflects the natural rights philosophy that authors should have the right to 
control their creative works without having to comply with burdensome 
formalities in every country in which they wanted to protect their works.92 
Unlike the copyright laws in many other countries, the Copyright Act 
of 197693 retained registration in the U.S. This time, registration was 
retained on a voluntary basis in order to continue building the Library of 
Congress’s collection of protected works and to provide it with as 
 
86. Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
135, 141–42 (2011).  
87. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, supra note 79; see also 2 
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 7.02[B] (2020) (detailing development of the 1976 Act); 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights] (incorporating Articles 1 
through 21 of the Berne Convention). 
88. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 9–12, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080, repealed by Copyright Act 
of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 407–412.  
89. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 87, at art. 9.  
90. NIMMER, supra note 87, § 7.02[B]. 
91. See Jane C. Ginsburg, “With Untired Spirits and Formal Constancy”: Berne Compatibility of 
Formal Declaratory Measures to Enhance Copyright Title-Searching, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 
1588–91 (2013). 
92. Robert C. Hauhart, Natural Law Basis for the Copyright Doctrine of Droit Moral, 30 CATH. 
LAW. 53, 62 (1985) (“Subsequent national and international charters and declarations have continued 
to ground their existence in natural law and natural rights concepts. Among these, one may find the 
Berne Convention and its doctrine of moral rights of authors.” (footnote omitted)).  
93. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401. 
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comprehensive a record as possible of protected works.94  The former is 
achieved through mandatory deposits of published works with the 
Library,95 and the latter is incentivized by granting enhanced protections 
for registered works.96 
The merits of copyright formalities generally and registration 
specifically have been much debated. Complying with formalities is 
expensive, particularly when dealing with more than one jurisdiction, but 
forgoing registration increases clearance costs for others trying to 
determine whether a work is copyrighted and the identity of the rights 
holder.97 These costs in turn hinder licensing of protected works and free 
use of unprotected works.98 Information technology has served to 
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the problem by significantly increasing 
the number of copyrightable works.99 
The rise in clearance costs has led some scholars and policy advocates 
to call for the reintroduction of formalities,100 particularly copyright 
registration,101 especially given that information technology can now 
reduce the cost of complying with such formalities.102 Some also argue 
that formalities can help enable reuse of cultural works and facilitate 
access to content.103 Other scholars also argue that compliance with 
formalities should be even more strongly incentivized,104 including for 
downstream transferees,105 especially during the final twenty years, which 
are not mandated by the TRIPS Agreement, the major international treaty 
on IP.106 Nonetheless, formalities continue to impose costs on copyright 
owners in a way that unregistered rights do not. 
 
94. Id. §§ 407–412. 
95. Id. § 407. 
96. Id. §§ 408, 502–505, 510. 
97. Stef van Gompel, Copyright Formalities in the Internet Age: Filters of Protection or 
Facilitators of Licensing, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1425, 1431–34 (2013). 
98. Id. at 1433. 
99. See Sprigman, supra note 67, at 526–27. 
100. See LESSIG, supra note 67, at 287–91; Gibson, supra note 67, at 221–29; Samuelson, supra 
note 67, at 562–63; van Gompel, supra note 67, at 395–423. 
101. See Sprigman, supra note 67, at 488 n.13. 
102. See Michael W. Caroll, A Realist Approach to Copyright Law’s Formalities, 28 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1511, 1525–32 (2013).  
103. Elkin-Koren, supra note 67, at 1563. 
104. See, e.g., Christopher Jon Sprigman, Berne’s Vanishing Ban on Formalities, 28 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1565, 1565–70 (2013) (advocating “new style” formalities to address the degree of 
protection, not whether a work is protected or not).  
105. See Ginsburg, supra note 91, at 1614–15; see also Gervais & Renaud, supra note 67, at 1492–
93. 
106. Maria A. Pallante, The Curious Case of Copyright Formalities, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1415, 1419 (2013). 
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D. Patent 
Unlike copyright and trademark law, patent law protects an invention 
only through registration and examination by a patent office.107 All three 
types of patent protections available in the U.S.—“utility patents” for new 
and useful processes, machines, articles of manufacture, and compositions 
of matter,108 “design patents” for new ornamental designs for articles of 
manufacture,109 and “plant patents” for new cultivated varieties of 
asexually reproducing plants—require registration.110 Of these, the most 
well-known are utility patents, which the USPTO examines under the 
various rigorous standards for patentability: subject matter eligibility,111 
novelty,112 nonobviousness,113 and utility.114 
For inventions that meet these exacting standards, protection is 
relatively brief but robust. Utility patents last for twenty years from the 
date of filing, as long as periodic maintenance fees are paid,115 and can 
even be extended under special circumstances.116 During that term, 
patents grant the right to exclude all others from making, using, selling, 
or offering an invention for sale, regardless of independent invention or 
even awareness of the patentee’s rights.117 Process patents also provide 
the exclusive right to import, use, or sell products made from the process 
in the U.S.118 Infringement can be remedied through injunctive relief119 
and damages of not less than a reasonable royalty,120 which may be 
trebled,121 although failure to mark the invention with the word “patent” 
 
107. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 7–20.  
108. 35 U.S.C. § 101; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 8–9. 
109. 35 U.S.C. § 171; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 8–9 (describing design patents as 
“cover[ing] nonfunctional product designs.”). 
110. 35 U.S.C. § 161; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 8–9.  
111. 35 U.S.C. § 101; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 9. 
112. 35 U.S.C. § 102; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 9. 
113. 35 U.S.C. § 103; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 9. 
114. 35 U.S.C. § 101; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 9. Other countries vary somewhat in their 
patentability criteria, although centralized filing procedures are available under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 (entered into force Apr. 1, 
2002) (allowing unified patent filing in member states), and the Convention on the Grant of European 
Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199 (allowing unified patent filing in EU member states). 
115. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
116. Id. § 154(b). 
117. Id. § 154(a)(1). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. § 283. 
120. Id. § 284. 
121. Id. 
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or “pat.” and the patent number122 does preclude a patentee from obtaining 
infringement damages, unless the patentee can prove that the infringer 
otherwise had notice of the patent.123 
Patent systems thus provide no automatic, unregistered alternative, 
although trade secrecy under federal or state law can provide such rights 
for inventions that are kept secret124 through reasonable measures to 
maintain that secrecy.125 Trade secrecy protects against only “wrongful” 
or “improper” acquisition or use of the secret,126 however, and provides 
no protection against independent creation or even innocent copying.127 
Patent law’s adamantly single-tiered approach may stem in large part 
from the idea that registration and examination are necessary to limit the 
potentially monopolistic effects that patents can create.128 Useful 
inventive concepts may be more rare than copyrightable expression or 
protectable trademarks, and defenses to infringement such as fair or 
experimental use or even independent creation do not exist in patent law, 
making patents particularly powerful.129 Technology is typically both 
cumulative, in that it builds upon itself, as well as complementary, in that 
it is used in conjunction with other technologies. As such, patent rights 
frequently create “anticommons,” in which the transaction costs of 
coordinating rights held by diverse owners with diverse interests and 
motivations ultimately prohibit productive use of those rights.130 Both 
registration and rigorous examination to ensure that a patent is in fact 
warranted can help limit these effects. 
Thus, although copyright and trademark law offer both registered and 
unregistered rights, patent law has never done so, taking instead a 
registered-only approach that offers the same unitary term of protection 
regardless of merit or value. Part II will discuss in greater detail the largely 
unacknowledged costs that this one-size-fits-all registered patent regime 
imposes. First is the overprotection of marginal inventions that require 
 
122. Id. § 287. 
123. Id. 
124. Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 39 (AM. L. INST. 1995) (“A trade secret is any information that can be used in the 
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an 
actual or potential economic advantage over others.”). 
125. See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86 
CALIF. L. REV. 241, 247–48 (1998). 
126. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1839. 
127. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(5) (defining “misappropriation” as copying or disclosing a trade secret 
through “improper means”). 
128. See Marcowitz-Bitton et al., supra note 27, at 77–88. 
129. Id. at 78–80; Marcowitz-Bitton & Michiko Morris, supra note 9, at 327. 
130. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 75–77. 
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little or no investment but also yield little or no value and in fact may yield 
negative value by obstructing technological development and use.131 
Second is the distributive effects that the resource-intensive patent 
registration and examination system has on certain inventors, particularly 
women and minorities, whose inventions often are underprotected 
because they are deterred from obtaining patents.132 
II. THE EXISTING REGIME, THE PATENT CRISIS AND THE 
DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF PATENT REGISTRATION 
A. The Existing Regime and the Patent Crisis 
The patent system is designed to incentivize innovation.133 Patents 
provide a bundle of exclusive rights that allow their owners to try to reap 
economic benefit from their inventions.134 Patent protection therefore is 
thought to advance human knowledge, science, and technology.135 Yet, 
the social gain of enhanced innovation comes with a price. Exclusive 
ownership of an invention can have monopolistic effects and result in 
inflation of the prices of goods sold under a patent.136 Patent law seeks to 
resolve this cost-benefit tension by limiting the duration of exclusivity.137 
The current system applies a one-size-fits-all approach, according the 
same twenty-year period of protection to all inventions irrespective of 
their value.138 In addition to this time limitation, patent law provides 
statutory and doctrinal safeguards against potential imbalances in the 
costs vis-à-vis benefits of patents, such as specified requirements for 
patentability and the availability of compulsory licensing in special 
circumstances of social need.139 However, inventions that meet the 
statutory patentability requirements of subject matter eligibility,140 
 
131. Marcowitz-Bitton et al., supra note 27, at 80. 
132. See generally Schuster et al., supra note 8. 
133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
134. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (providing rights of exclusivity); Cotropia, supra note 3, at 168–71 
(noting the incentive effects of these rights); Lemley, supra note 3, at 129–30. 
135. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 8. 
136. Id. at 68, 71. 
137. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
138. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Reinventing Copyright and Patent, 113 MICH. 
L. REV. 231, 233–34 (2014). 
139. 35 U.S.C. § 101; Gianna Julian-Arnold, International Compulsory Licensing: The Rationales 
and the Reality, 33 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 349, 349–55 (1993). 
140. 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
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utility,141 novelty,142 and non-obviousness143 all receive the same 
potentially monopolistic level of protection. All patentees have the 
exclusive rights to use, sell, offer for sale, and import patented 
inventions144 for the same, unitary twenty-year period of protection. 
Affording all inventors identical rights of exclusivity under this one-size-
fits-all paradigm, however, without taking into account the cost of the 
invention or its economic and social value, creates several problems. 
First, the current system undermines the constitutional mandate on 
which it is based. Article 1, Section 8 of the United States Constitution 
establishes that “Congress shall have power . . . . To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”145 The current one-size-fits-all system, however, protects 
low-investment inventions to the same extent that it protects inventions 
requiring much more significant investments, thus providing unnecessary 
incentives for innovations that quite possibly would have occurred 
anyway. More specifically, if an invention can be created at a low cost, or 
at virtually no cost at all, no patent incentive is required in order “to 
promote” the creation of the invention.146 As Professor Maayan Perel has 
noted, the current system often issues “patents whose development is not 
dependent on the patent act’s pecuniary incentives.”147 
Similarly, many commentators argue that even under patent law’s 
currently rigorous application and examination scheme, too many low-
quality patents are clogging up the system and weighing down 
technological progress.148 Scholars like Professors Fagundes and Masur, 
for example, argue that patents are much more likely to cover inventions 
that are of low social value than copyrights are to cover expressive works 
of low value.149 This is because the costs of ensuring that inventions truly 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. § 102. 
143. Id. § 103. 
144. Id. § 154(a)(1). 
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
146. See Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 13–
14 (2005). 
147. See Perel, supra note 14, at 282–88. 
148. See Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 
69–71 (2009). 
149. David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 677, 
679, 726–28 (2012). That being said, Fagundes and Masur do not specify how they measure social 
value for either patented or copyrighted creations and instead seem to rely on the idea that inventions 
of low economic value necessarily lead to patents of low social value. See, e.g., id. at 686 n.21, 687 
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meet the patentability requirements are prohibitively high for the 
USPTO.150 Because low-quality inventions typically contribute very little 
to the “Progress of . . . useful Arts,” a constitutional mandate 
incentivizing the creation of such inventions would seem likewise to be 
reduced.151 
Second, the current patent system grants the same level of protection to 
both high- and low-investment patents.152 This results in an imbalance 
between the ex post costs of short-term monopolistic rights and the ex ante 
benefits of higher incentives for innovation.153 The decreased competition 
and increased costs associated with a patent monopoly thus exceed the 
social benefits derived from such innovations.154 
To appreciate this point, consider the costs imposed by the current 
system. Patents can inflict deadweight losses on society because patentees 
may be able to sell their inventions at higher, monopolistic prices.155 Users 
whose benefits from using a patented invention would be greater than its 
competitive price nonetheless will forgo using the invention if it is instead 
sold at a higher monopolistic price. This causes a loss of not only the profit 
the patentee would have earned had they sold their invention at its 
competitive price but also the value of the utility users would have 
received from using the patented invention had its price been lower.156 
Such forgone transactions thus result in deadweight losses equal to the 
combined surplus the parties would have received in a competitive 
market.157 Under a freely competitive regime, by contrast, inventors tend 
 
(stating that “[a] patent with low private value will have low social value, but a patent with low social 
value will not necessarily have low private value” because patentees can still profit from patents on 
“low social value” inventions by threatening and thereby extorting fees from others (citing Jonathan 
S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687 (2010))).  
150. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present 
Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55, 58–59 (2003); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at 
the Patent Office, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497–500 (2001). 
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1966) (“The 
Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not overreach the restraints imposed by the stated 
constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, 
advancement or social benefit gained thereby.”). 
152. Perel, supra note 14, at 282. 
153. Id. 
154. See David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for 
Restricting Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 186, 193–94 (2009). 
155. See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 204–05 
(10th ed. 2014). 
156. See Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in Information: 
Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives to Generate Information, and the 
Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
301, 304 (1998).  
157. MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 41–42 (2004). 
Marcowitz-Bitton and Michiko Morris  (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:51 PM 
2020] UNREGISTERED PATENTS 1857 
 
to sell their inventions at lower prices closer to their marginal cost of 
production, which for low-investment inventions may still yield sufficient 
net revenues to incentivize what little investment was necessary to bring 
the inventions to the public.158 
Of course, costs imposed by the patent system may be justified if they 
help promote innovation. This is because innovations such as patentable 
inventions share the characteristics of so-called public goods. A public 
good is defined by two fundamental characteristics: (1) nonrivalrousness, 
which means that consumption by one person does not leave less for any 
other consumer, and (2) nonexcludability, which is the high cost or, often, 
impossibility of excluding nonpaying beneficiaries from consuming the 
good.159 Without the possibility of recouping the costs of producing such 
a good by extracting payment from consumers, no private profit-
maximizing firm would have the incentive to supply it.160 For creations 
such as inventions, the incentives to create and produce an invention or its 
resulting goods suffer from the relative ease of copying and the inability 
of innovators to recapture the sunk costs of creation by extracting 
payment.161 This problem thus must be solved either through subsidies or 
through supracompetitive pricing.162 The patent system employs the latter 
strategy by guaranteeing the exclusivity necessary for supracompetitive 
pricing and the possibility to recoup the fixed cost of invention.163 It is in 
this way that the patent system seeks to “promote the Progress 
of . . . useful Arts.”164 
To justify the grant of patent rights, however, the deadweight loss 
occasioned by such supracompetitive pricing must be outweighed by the 
social benefit of incentives to innovate.165 With low-investment 
inventions, this balancing equation seems to collapse.166 When the process 
of inventing depends on relatively low monetary expenses, inventors are 
less dependent on the pecuniary incentive of a right to exclude others from 
 
158. See Calandrillo, supra note 156, at 304–05. 
159. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 146, at 13. 
160. See Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual 
Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853, 854–59 (1992) (identifying this as market failure); Wendy J. 
Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. 
REV. 149, 223–24, 230–38 (1992). 
161. Olson, supra note 154, at 196. 
162. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 108 (Denise Clinton et al. eds., 
5th ed. 2008). 
163. See SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 36–37 (2004). 
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
165. See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 
1824–25 (1984). 
166. Perel, supra note 14, at 287–88. 
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their inventions.167 With no substantial need to recoup their costs of 
invention, inventors will invent so long as they expect their inventions to 
make at least minimal profit.168 
Thanks to the exclusivity ensured by patent protection, however, 
patentees of low-investment inventions may be able to sell copies of their 
inventions for several times their marginal costs of production, regardless 
of whether the patentees actually need to earn such supracompetitive 
returns.169 Thus, because the current one-size-fits-all system of patent 
protection does not align the costs of investment or value of an invention 
with the length or breadth of patent protection, low-investment inventions 
impose deadweight losses without countervailing societal benefit.170 If the 
cost of creating an invention is low enough that its inventor needed little 
to no return on it, there is no need for the patent system to force society to 
pay a higher monopolistic price for it. The social benefit of patenting thus 
would be outweighed by the deadweight losses it causes. The fact that 
society pays equally to promote all inventions, regardless of their 
respective investments, introduces inefficiency. 
Third, the current one-size-fits-all patent system distorts the incentive 
structure of the patent system. As noted above, the current system 
frequently makes low-investment but patentable inventions much more 
profitable than high-investment inventions. If identical protection and 
potentially similar earning opportunities compensate for smaller and 
larger investments in R&D alike, inventors will rationally minimize their 
investments and skew their efforts toward low-investment inventions.171 
Indeed, this tendency will be even more marked if the low-investment 
patents cover inventions needed for complementary or cumulative 
technologies. In this case the low-investment patents could also be used 
to extract licensing or other rents from other inventors, making the system 
more vulnerable to abuse.172 Moreover, because the current one-size-fits-
all system of patent protection does not take into account the magnitude 
of investments in invention, inventors are also effectively incentivized to 
minimize their overall research investments, thereby increasing the odds 
 
167. See Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the Utilitarian Foundation 
of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897, 898, 921, 951 (2009). 
168. See id. at 927–28. 
169. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 138, at 240. This does not include “pirate” companies 
that simply elect to ignore patents and take their chances in court, hoping that they can avoid 
infringement or invalidate the patent. Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 
21–22. 
170. Calandrillo, supra note 156, at 327–28. 
171. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 138, at 239–40. 
172. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 
1991, 1992–93 (2007). 
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that they will produce low-quality inventions, in turn reducing 
social welfare.173 
Fourth, the current one-size-fits-all approach creates a drag on 
innovation by others. Allowing patent owners to obtain licensing revenues 
greatly exceeding their investment in their patents could hamper the 
ability of downstream innovators to commercialize and benefit from their 
own innovations.174 Patentees can demand such excess rents through 
holdups and threats of patent litigation.175 Defendants who have already 
sunk large investments into developing and commercializing products that 
now appear to infringe those patents will be highly motivated to pay 
whatever royalties or licensing fees are demanded of them.176 Otherwise, 
the defendants may have to stop developing and commercializing their 
products if the patents at issue are found to be valid and infringed.177 As 
the rich literature on patent holdups and patent trolls explains, agreeing to 
pay excessive licensing fees is not a genuine exercise of free will, but a 
coerced last resort.178 By generating income through aggressive licensing 
and litigation instead of commercialization, patent trolls ultimately hinder 
subsequent innovation at great cost to social welfare. If, on the other hand, 
patentees received protection that more closely resembled their actual 
investment in their patents, improper injunctive threats and strategic 
holdups could be drastically reduced.179 
Fifth, the proliferation of patents leads to holdouts, patent thickets, 
patent trolling, and other phenomena that overdeter other inventors from 
working on worthwhile projects for fear of infringing another’s patents.180 
This is in some part due to the fact that technology may also be more 
incremental, cumulative, or complementary than expressive works, 
trademarks, or trade secrets,181 and inventive concepts are often more 
 
173. See 2 JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 13:31 (2d ed. 
2015). But see Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 663, 716–17 (2019) 
(explaining why inventors might be better off investing in research in order to create working 
examples of their invention rather than filing early with a prophetic example of the invention). 
174. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 172, at 2009–10. 
175. Id. at 1992–93. 
176. Id.  
177. See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and One Not to), 
48 B.C. L. REV. 149, 153–54 (2007). 
178. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 172, at 1993; Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic 
and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 541–43 (2003). 
179. Meurer, supra note 178, at 541–43. 
180. Robert G. Harris, Patent Assertion Entities & Privateers: Economic Harms to Innovation and 
Competition, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 281 passim (2014). 
181. See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley Jr., Copyright at the School of Patent, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 
146, 167, 182 (1991) (arguing that authorship is much less incremental than invention). 
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difficult to design around.182 Unlike other IP rights, moreover, patent law 
has very few safe harbors from infringement to protect inventors from 
opportunistic claims of infringement and from overdeterring others from 
using and building on existing technologies.183 For instance, both 
copyright and trade secrecy allow independent creation as a complete 
defense to infringement,184 but this defense does not apply to patent 
infringement, which is a strict liability offense that does not require that 
the alleged infringer even know that the invention was patented.185 Patent 
law also lacks the fair-use defense, which in copyright and trademark law 
allows others to copy protected marks or expression for uses such as 
commentary, satire, etc.186 The few safety valves that patent law does 
possess are very narrow and seldom applicable. Prior-user right 
exceptions to patent infringement are common in a number of countries 
but apply only to those who were using an invention, often only if in a 
commercial setting, before another independent creator filed an 
application to patent that invention.187 Likewise, many countries allow 
experimental-use exceptions to patent infringement, but the only 
commercial uses allowed are for the clinical trials needed for regulatory 
approval of generic pharmaceuticals.188 A few other more specific 
exceptions exist, such as the U.S. patent system’s section 287(c) 
 
182. See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 149, at 712–14. 
183. Some scholars doubt the effectiveness of such safety valves in buffering against the negative 
effects of IP rights on others, however, see Sprigman, supra note 67, at 526–27. 
184. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991); Procter & Gamble 
Co. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 74, 77–78 (2d Cir. 1999). Trademark law does not allow an 
independent creation defense, however, see Blendco, Inc. v. Conagra Foods, Inc., 132 F. App’x 520, 
523 (5th Cir. 2005). 
185. Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1926 (2015); Kewanee 
Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 490 (1974). 
186. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
1483, 1505 (2013) (explaining that fair use allows descriptive use of another’s trademark); Elizabeth 
L. Rosenblatt, Intellectual Property’s Negative Space: Beyond the Utilitarian, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
441, 452 (2013) (describing fair use as “use-based carve-outs” from copyright infringement liability). 
Copyright law in the U.S. also contains a number of compulsory licenses, and other countries do avail 
themselves of compulsory licensing of patents as well, as allowed under the TRIPS agreement. See 
generally David N. Makous & Mina I. Hamilton, Compulsory IP Licensing and Standards-Setting, 
Standard-Essential Patents and F/RAND, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING STRATEGIES 95 
(Thomson Reuters & Aspatore, 2014 ed.). In the U.S., however, rights holders have thus far 
successfully resisted compulsory licensing of trade secrets, trademarks, and patents. Id. 
187. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., REPORT ON PRIOR USER RIGHTS 2–3, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/ip/global/prior_user_rights.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA2X-
33WJ] (report drafted by DK, DE, FR, UK).  
188. See generally Hans-Rainer Jaenichen & Johann Pitz, Research Exemption/Experimental Use 
in the European Union: Patents Do Not Block the Progress of Science, COLD SPRING HARBOR 
PERSPS. MED., 2015, at 1 (describing the status of the experimental-use exception in EU 
member states). 
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exemption from damages for infringement of patents on “medical 
activit[ies]” by “medical practitioner[s]” and “related health care 
entit[ies]” but these exceptions are even more constrained.189 This paucity 
of defenses to patent infringement, combined with the costs and 
uncertainty of infringement litigation, causes inventors to often give 
patents a much wider berth than they merit.190 Patents are therefore more 
likely than other types of IP rights to overdeter others. 
The anticommons dynamic prevalent in the current system is a notable 
example of how too many patents can stifle innovation.191 Anticommons 
result from overfragmentation of property rights192 that distribute the right 
to exclude into the hands of too many owners.193 This often occurs in the 
patent context when several different patents cover complementary 
elements of a product or different steps in a cumulative innovative 
process.194 The heightened transaction costs and potential for holdouts 
that result from an anticommons easily lead to bargaining breakdowns 
whenever the development of a product requires permission from the 
owners of two or more elements or steps.195 One example of the 
anticommons problem is DNA sequence patents,196 of which hundreds 
cover specific genes or gene fragments.197 The current one-size-fits-all 
patent system exacerbates the anticommons problem by allowing the 
 
189. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c); see also Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An 
Incomplete Intersection at 35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 601, 641–45 (2000).  
190. See Bert I. Huang, Surprisingly Punitive Damages, 100 VA. L. REV. 1027, 1046–47 (2014) 
(discussing in terrorem effects of copyright law); see also Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive 
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 117–18 (2006) (discussing in terrorem 
effects of patents). 
191. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 75–77; Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the 
Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998). 
192. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–99 (1998); Arti K. Rai, The Information 
Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-
Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 192–94. 
193. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 76. 
194. Id. 
195. See id.; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A 
Counter-Proposal to Richard Epstein’s Steady Course, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE 
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 195, 197–98 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free 
Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 356 (1991). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION (1961) (describing the problems of collective action). 
196. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 86; cf. Dan L. Burk, Introduction: A Biotechnology 
Primer, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 611, 621–28 (1994). 
197. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Reaching Through the Genome, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES 
OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 209, 210–11 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003); S. M. Thomas, A. R. W. 
Davies, N. J. Birtwistle, S. M. Crowther & J. F. Burke, Commentary, Ownership of the Human 
Genome, 380 NATURE 387, 387–88 (1996). 
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proliferation of multiple low-investment and low-quality patents. 
This proliferation of low-investment and low-quality patents also 
implicates the closely related issue of patent thickets. Patent thickets are 
distinguished from anticommons by the overlapping nature of the patents 
involved, such that practicing even a single patent out of the thicket could 
necessarily entail infringement of others.198 Anticommons are thus a 
problem of coordinating large numbers of patents, while patent thickets 
are a problem of coordinating overlaps between patents. The current 
patent system fosters such thickets by permitting separate inventors to 
patent small, cumulative contributions to the same product.199 As these 
overlapping patents accumulate, it becomes nearly impossible to pierce 
the patent thicket and secure the necessary consent for continued 
innovation.200 Patent thickets are also created when patent offices err in 
the examination and vetting process, inadvertently granting overlapping 
patents to several inventors.201 In the current patent system, such mistakes 
are a by-product of both the low quality of patents and their high numbers, 
which overwhelm the capacity of patent offices to sift through them all 
carefully. 
The one-size-fits-all approach of the existing patent system thus can be 
seen as the root of many instances in which patents overprotect inventions 
and overdistribute the rights to those protections amongst inventors. The 
result is to hinder, rather than promote, technological progress, a direct 
contradiction of the very purpose of the patent system. An alternative form 
of patent protection that offers a better match to the actual investment in 
and value of many inventions would help mitigate this perverse effect of 
the current system. 
B. Distributive Effects of Patent Registries 
Despite the thickets, trolls, and anticommons that plague the modern-
day patent system, that same system also underprotects many inventors. 
A variety of factors contribute to the gender, race, and other demographic 
and economic gaps seen amongst patent holders, but the current 
registration and examination regime is one significant factor that 
contributes to these distributive effects in ways that have been long 
overlooked, despite the large body of social science and legal scholarship 
 
198. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 77–78, 89–92; Shapiro, supra note 16, at 121. 
199. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 90. 
200. Id. at 78. 
201. Id. (suggesting that “[b]ecause patent examiners spend very little time with each patent, 
patents regularly issue that would not withstand more searching scrutiny, and indeed nearly half of 
all litigated patents are held invalid”). 
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on the subject.202 Similar distributive effects are seen in other areas of IP, 
but these effects are most marked in patent rights.203 
1. Distributive Effects on Women, Racial Minorities, and 
Entrepreneurs 
For example, a large number of studies, including a comprehensive 
2016 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) study of 
international patent application patterns, have shown a sizeable gender 
gap in applications for, grants, and ownership of patents. In the WIPO 
study, for example, fewer than 30% of international patent applications 
listed any female inventors, and less than 5% listed only female 
inventors.204 Women in academia also hold fewer patents, even in fields 
such as bioscience, where female academics are more numerous,205 and 
women generally patent less often than they publish.206 
Moreover, although patents by women are thought to be equal to or 
better in quality and impact than those by men,207 other research shows 
patent applications from women were more likely to be rejected.208 Patent 
applications by female inventors, for example, are 21% more likely to be 
 
202. See Anjali Vats & Deidre A. Keller, Critical Race IP, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 735, 
752–55 (2018). 
203. Robert Brauneis & Dotan Oliar, An Empirical Study of the Race, Ethnicity, Gender, and Age 
of Copyright Registrants, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 46 (2018) (studying racial, ethnic, gender and age 
gaps in copyright registration). No empirical work to date has documented gaps in trademark 
registration for extended periods. See NAT’L WOMEN’S BUS. COUNCIL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND  WOMEN  ENTREPRENEURS  46  (2012),  https://cdn.www.nwbc.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2018/02  /27192725/ Qualitative-Analysis-Intellectual-Property-Women-Entrepreneurs-Part-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H2CQ-FCFD] (documenting the gender gap in trademark filing and registration and 
concluding “[w]omen have a significantly higher participation in Trademark activity as compared to 
Patent activity”). 
204. Martinez et al., supra note 7, at 8; see also U.K. INTELL. PROP. OFF., GENDER PROFILES IN 
WORLDWIDE PATENTING: AN ANALYSIS OF FEMALE INVENTORSHIP 30 (2016), 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/5
67518/Gender-profiles-in-worldwide-patenting.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9M2-58QX]. 
205. Annette I. Kahler, Examining Exclusion in Woman-Inventor Patenting: A Comparison of 
Educational Trends and Patent Data in the Era of Computer Engineer Barbie, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 773, 776–77 (2011). 
206. Rainer Frietsch, Inna Haller, Melanie Funken-Vrohlings & Hariolf Grupp, Gender-Specific 
Patterns in Patenting and Publishing, 38 RSCH. POL’Y 590, 595 (2009). 
207. G. Steven McMillan, Gender Differences in Patenting Activity: An Examination of the U.S. 
Biotechnology Industry, 80 SCIENTOMETRICS 683, 683 (2009); Kjersten Bunker Whittington & Laurel 
Smith-Doerr, Gender and Commercial Science: Women’s Patenting in the Life Sciences, 30 J. TECH. 
TRANSFER, 355, 363–66 (2005). 
208. Jensen et al., supra note 11, at 307. 
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rejected by the USPTO than those by men.209 The USPTO also tends to 
grant fewer claims in women’s applications and to narrow those claims 
that they did allow in scope and value more than those in 
men’s applications.210 
Studies on IP law and gender have revealed other ways in which the 
law and how it is applied also contribute to gender disparities in IP rights, 
including patents.211 For example, the seemingly gender-neutral but vague 
“PHOSITA” (Person Having Ordinary Skill In The Art) standard for 
measuring utility and nonobviousness is often interpreted and applied in 
gender-biased ways.212 Likewise, patentable subject matter doctrine relies 
on frequently androcentric definitions of “invention,” “technology,” and 
“industrial application” that exclude the types of social or otherwise 
nonmechanical inventions that women often create.213 Empirical data also 
suggest gender biases among patent examiners, who are more likely to 
reject part or all of applications from inventors whose first names are 
widely recognized as feminine.214 
Women also have difficulty in even accessing the patent system. The 
patenting process can cost as much as tens of thousands of dollars per 
patent,215 but women tend to have fewer financial resources, such as 
access to venture capital and other funding.216 Women also have less 
access to the kinds of networking and other support structures that can 
help negotiate the complexities of patent drafting, filing, and 
 
209. Id. In other words, applications filed by women are more likely to be rejected regardless of 
the field of technology or science to which the invention belongs. When the researchers controlled 
for technology class, the rejection rate fell to 7%, as women were more likely to apply for patents in 
technology classes with lower acceptance rates. Id. 
210. Id. at 308.  
211. Kara W. Swanson, Intellectual Property and Gender: Reflections on Accomplishments and 
Methodology, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 175, 176 (2015). 
212. Dan L. Burk, Diversity Levers, 23 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 25, 34–42 (2015); Dan L. 
Burk, Do Patents Have Gender?, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 881, 883–907 (2011). 
213. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Eligible Patent Matter—Gender Analysis of Patent Law: 
International and Comparative Perspectives, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 851, 851 (2011). 
214. Jensen et al., supra note 11, at 309. 
215. USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. [hereinafter USPTO Fee Schedule], 
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-
schedule#Patent%20Fees [https://perma.cc/UKK5-V5RN] (listing the fee schedule effective 
October 2, 2020). 
216. ALICIA ROBB, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFF. OF ADVOC., ACCESS TO CAPITAL AMONG 
YOUNG FIRMS, MINORITY-OWNED FIRMS, WOMEN-OWNED FIRMS, AND HIGH-TECH FIRMS 31 
(2013), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/rs403tot(2).pdf [https://perma.cc/L3L6-WK65]; 
Paula E. Stephan & Asmaa El-Ganainy, The Entrepreneurial Puzzle: Explaining the Gender Gap, 32 
J. TECH. TRANSFER 475, 483–86 (2007). 
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prosecution.217 And of course, outright sexism amongst colleagues, 
industry, and even customers has a deleterious effect on female inventors, 
often causing them to misjudge the patentability and importance of their 
own work.218 
The resulting gender gap in patent ownership has consequences for 
women who want to commercialize their innovations. Patents not only 
protect against free-riding on investments in inventing and 
commercializing those inventions219 but also help to signal technological 
expertise and innovative legitimacy to potential investors and cross-
licensing partners.220 Likewise, patent applications and patents help attract 
investment funding from sources such as venture capitalists.221 Patents 
even serve an important role in deterring infringement lawsuits by others 
by furnishing meaningful grounds for countersuit.222 The inability to 
obtain patent protections thus has obvious economic implications 
for women. 
By contrast, racial and ethnic gaps in patenting have not been as well 
studied as the gender gap in patenting, although a few legal scholars have 
explored the intersection of patenting and race over various periods in 
time. Historically, African Americans could not own patents because they 
were not considered “citizens” of the United States.223 Of course, this also 
meant that those who held African Americans as enslaved peoples also 
could not patent the inventions created by these people either, as neither 
the enslaved inventor nor the purported owner had standing to make the 
required inventor’s oath.224 These deeply racist laws were later abrogated 
 
217. See Wenpin Tsai & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of 
Intrafirm Networks, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 464, 473 (1998); MILLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 22–26. 
218. NAT’L WOMEN’S BUS. COUNCIL, supra note 203, at 15–17; Fiona Murray & Leigh Graham, 
Buying Science and Selling Science: Gender Differences in the Market for Commercial Science, 16 
INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 657, 667–69 (2007); Christine Wenneras & Agnes Wold, Commentary, 
Nepotism and Sexism in Peer-Review, 387 NATURE 341, 341 (1997). 
219. MILLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 16; Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property 
for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 338–45 (2008); Landes & Posner, supra note 68, 
at 328–33. But see Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343–47 (2010) 
(questioning whether the current patent system provides adequate protection for 
commercialization investments). 
220. Stuart J. H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson & Ted Sichelman, High Technology 
Entrepreneurs and the Patent System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1255, 1287–309 (2009). 
221. MILLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 15–16. 
222. Ted Sichelman & Stuart J. H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 
MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 124–25 (2010). 
223. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 396 (1857), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.  
224. Invention of a Slave, 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 171, 171–72 (1858); Brian L. Frye, Invention of a Slave, 
68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181, 181, 188 (2018).  
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by the Thirteenth Amendment, but the historical exclusion of African 
Americans from the U.S. patent system continued long afterward.225 
For example, Cook and Kongcharoen226 examined patenting patterns 
among women and African American inventors as identified by their first 
names, and identified only a little over 1,000 African American inventors 
from an initial pool of approximately 1.2 million U.S. inventor names 
(0.00083%).227 Another study of the 2003 National Survey of College 
Graduates dataset228 revealed that Hispanic and Black inventors are 
among the least likely to file patent applications, particularly among male 
inventors.229 The study also showed that the USPTO was less likely to 
grant applications by either female inventors or Black and Hispanic 
inventors.230 A recent study by Schuster et al. confirms these results and 
clearly shows that minority inventors in the U.S. are less likely to secure 
patents compared to white male inventors.231 The distributive effects of 
the patent registration system thus may affect racial minorities as well as 
women. 
One surprising third group of inventors on whom the current patent 
registration system imposes distributive effects are entrepreneurs. 
Entrepreneurs, who by definition take on greater financial risks in starting 
and operating their businesses, contribute significantly to economic 
growth globally and in the U.S.232 Because of the inherent risk, 
entrepreneurs also rely heavily on IP protections, which often affect the 
opportunities for and the success or failure of entrepreneurial 
endeavors.233 Recent research on American entrepreneurs suggests that 
the patent system disadvantages entrepreneurs, however, by discouraging 
them from seeking patent protection.234 
 
225. Frye, supra note 224, at 223–29.  
226. Lisa D. Cook & Chaleampong Kongcharoen, The Idea Gap in Pink and Black (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 16331, 2010), https://www.nber.org/papers/w16331.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DEE6-36FP]. 
227. Id. at 41. 
228. MILLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 5.  
229. Id.  
230. Id. at 6; see also Schuster et al., supra note 8, at 306.  
231. Schuster et al., supra note 8, at 303.  
232. See DAVID B. AUDRETSCH, MAX C. KEILBACH & ERIK E. LEHMANN, ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 7 (1st ed. 2006) (noting that entrepreneurs are more willing to take risks); 
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, 
CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 74–79 (1934) (discussing entrepreneurship 
generally); Martin A. Carree & A. Roy Thurik, The Impact of Entrepreneurship on Economic Growth, 
in HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH 437 (Zoltan J. Acs & David B. Audretsch eds., 
2003) (examining the relationship between economic growth and entrepreneurship). 
233. See Sichelman, supra note 222, at 114–15. 
234. Graham et al., supra note 220, at 1309–15. 
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Of most relevance to the discussion here, among the many reasons they 
cited for not pursuing patents, entrepreneurs pointed to the cost of 
obtaining a patent, including attorneys’ fees, and the cost of enforcing the 
patent, including litigation, as two of the leading factors.235 Interestingly, 
start-ups’ reasons to forgo patenting differed by industry: software 
companies, whose invention development cycles tend to be rapid and 
brief, cited patent prosecution costs as the reason for abstaining from 
patenting, while biotechnology companies, whose invention development 
cycles are frequently slow and uncertain, cited a reluctance to disclose 
information as the reason.236 These results are similar to those found in 
the Small Business Administration survey of small firms conducted in 
1998237 and the findings reported in the Carnegie Mellon study.238 
Patent reform initiatives have tried to address the cost concern by 
introducing lower filing and maintenance fees for small entities. “Small 
entities” of 500 or fewer employees, as well as universities and non-profit 
organizations, can qualify for a 50% reduction in fees.239 The America 
Invents Act (AIA) also allows “micro entities,” defined as small entities 
with gross earnings of no more than three times the median household 
income in the past year and who are not assigned to an entity with greater 
earnings, a 75% fee discount.240 While these fee reductions are important 
and helpful for small business interests, they do nothing to mitigate 
attorneys’ fees, which comprise the more significant patenting costs.241 
While some argue that patent registration and examination do not 
disenfranchise as many inventors as a similar screening system would do 
under copyright law,242 in reality, a significant number of inventors are 
disenfranchised by the costs and complexities of the patent registration 
and examination system as well as its inherent biases.243 Importantly, that 
disenfranchisement falls systematically and disproportionately on women 
 
235. Id. at 1309–12. 
236. Id. at 1312–14. 
237. JOSEPH J. CORDES, HENRY R. HERTZFELD & NICHOLAS S. VONORTAS, U.S. SMALL BUS. 
ADMIN., A SURVEY OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 55–58 (1999), www.sba.gov/advo/research/ 
rs189tot.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MYW-M82H]. 
238. Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 15–16 (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7552, 2000). 
239. USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 215; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.27 (2019) (defining 
“small entity”).  
240. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 10, 125 Stat. 284, 316–19 (2011). 
Micro entities also cannot have been named in more than four previous patent applications. Id. 
241. See Graham et al., supra note 220, at 1311. 
242. Wiley, supra note 181, at 182–83 (noting that authors greatly outnumber inventors). 
243. MILLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 18–28.  
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and people of color in particular.244 
2. The Characteristics of Patent Registration 
Many factors contribute to the underrepresentation of women, 
minorities, and entrepreneurs, but patent registration is undoubtedly a 
significant factor. Three specific but long overlooked characteristics of 
the patent registration system are to blame: the costs of obtaining and 
maintaining registered patent rights; the dependence of registration on 
human judgement and the natural human predilection toward bias; and the 
need to understand the intricacies of the registration as well as the value 
of the rights it yields. 
As compared to the much lower costs of obtaining copyrights or 
trademarks, the patenting process is quite complex and resource intensive. 
Even for inventors who are aware that their inventions might be 
patentable, determining whether an invention is patentable is inherently 
difficult because the standards for protection are much stricter than those 
in copyright, trademark, or trade secrecy. Before applying for a patent, 
inventors must conduct patent searches to verify whether their inventions 
meet the standards for patentability over existing technologies.245 Because 
the information costs of identifying and analyzing all relevant prior art can 
be considerable, patent searches alone range from $165 to $660.246 
If the patent search indicates that a patent is worth pursuing, inventors 
can apply for a “provisional” patent application to give themselves up to 
a year to explore whether to invest further,247 but the fee for filing a 
provisional patent adds another $75 to $300 in costs.248 As noted above, 
the mandatory filing fees for nonprovisional applications vary with filing 
entity and the complexity of the invention and range from a few hundred 
dollars to more than two thousand. Surcharges for late submission, 
extension of time, accelerated examination, and other special requests can 
also increase the cost of patent filing by thousands of dollars.249 
In addition, many patent applicants seek assistance from patent agents 
or patent attorneys during the application process. The complexity and 
rigor of the patenting process can take years, with an average pendency of 
 
244.Kanze et al., supra note 6, at 588–89; MILLI ET AL., supra note 6, at 5–6, 18–28; Martinez 
et al., supra note 7, at 1–4. 
245. Patent Process Overview, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. [hereinafter Patent Process 
Overview],  https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-process-overview  [https://perma. 
cc/RXQ9-M5SX].  
246. USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 215. 
247. Patent Process Overview, supra note 245. 
248. USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 215. 
249. Id. 
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just under three years.250 Patent attorneys’ fees can thus accumulate and 
range between $6,000 to $20,000 or more.251 If the patent application is 
rejected, all of these fees are lost. If the application is ultimately granted, 
on the other hand, the applicant must pay yet more fees for issuance and 
publication,252 ranging from $400 to $475 in total.253 Post-issuance, 
patentees are assessed maintenance fees at the 3.5-, 7.5-, and 11.5-year 
mark as well.254 Like filing fees, maintenance fees vary, but maintaining 
a patent through its full term requires approximately $3,200 to over 
$12,000 in fees.255 
In total, the costs of simply obtaining a patent could run to tens of 
thousands of dollars and bring no guarantees of actually securing patent 
rights.256 Predicting the commercial value of an invention is also 
immensely difficult, adding to the gamble in deciding whether to invest 
in the process of applying for patent protection, even if through a 
provisional patent application.257 For disadvantaged inventors such as 
women, entrepreneurs, and minority groups, the financial resources 
needed to file a patent application are often prohibitive, causing many to 
forgo patent protection altogether. 
Furthermore, the patent registration and examination process is not 
only costly but also a convenient platform for discriminatory effects, 
particularly in combination with the vague and often complex standards 
for patentability and the potential biases among patent examiners. For one 
thing, patentability standards are intentionally broad and vague to address 
not only the growing diversity of patentable technologies, but also the 
creation of the very unforeseeably novel technologies that the patent 
 
250. Vic Lin, How Long Is the US Patent Application Process (How Much Time Does It Take to 
Get  a  Utility  Patent)?,  PAT. TRADEMARK  BLOG:  IP  Q&A,  http://www.patenttrademarkblog. 
com/how-long-us-utility-patent-application-process/  [https://perma.cc/4AGZ-VWR5]  (reporting 
average total patent pendency was thirty-three months in 2017). 
251. Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the U.S., IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/ 
[https://perma.cc/LGP4-M2GA]. 
252. Patent Process Overview, supra note 245. 
253. USPTO Fee Schedule, supra note 215. Issuance fees range from $100 to $175 and publication 
fees are generally $300. Id. 
254. Id. 
255. See id.  
256. Id. 
257. Provisional patent applications are typically less expensive to file because they do not undergo 
examination and simply preserve the applicants’ filing date. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b)(3). Provisional 
applications must be converted to nonprovisional status within a year, however, so applicants must 
eventually assume the full cost of prosecuting their applications. Id. § 111(b)(5). 
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system is designed to incentivize.258 The ambiguity of these standards, 
however, also allows patent examiners to exercise discretion in ways that 
can be discriminatory.259 
Beyond the costs and potential biases of patent examination, another 
major issue is simply the abstruse nature of the process and general lack 
of understanding of its intricacies. As noted above, for example, female 
inventors often do not file for patents because they lack access to 
knowledgeable guidance through the process and at times have the 
mistaken perception that their invention is unpatentable.260 A lack of 
awareness of one’s legal rights can be equivalent to having no rights at 
all. The modern movement toward helping disadvantaged groups gain 
access to the legal system261 has led many countries to launch projects 
toward that end,262 but these efforts are unlikely to yield significant change 
in the public’s access to legal knowledge any time soon. This is all the 
more true with regard to patent laws and procedures because of 
their complexity. 
Accordingly, even if their inventions have enough value to warrant the 
cost of patent prosecution, not all inventors will see filing for patent 
protection as worthwhile or even possible under the current system.263 A 
patent system that obviated the costs, complexities, and opportunity for 
biases inherent in the registration and examination process could go a long 
way to remedying the gender, race, and other gaps in patenting. The next 
Part discusses possible reforms to the patent regime, arguing that the 
challenges posed by the one-size-fits-all approach of the patent system 
and the distributive effects of patent registration can be addressed by the 
introduction of an unregistered patent regime. 
 
258. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576 
(2003); Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules? Patents and the (Uncertain) Rules of the Game, 18 
MICH. TELECOMMS. & TECH. L. REV. 481, 486 (2012). 
259. Evan J. Criddle, When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process of Administrative 
Lawmaking, 46 GA. L. REV. 117, 162 (2011); see also Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem of Gender 
and Racial Bias in Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1532, 1533, 1544–49 (1995) 
(noting the gender, racial, and cultural biases that often plague agency decision making). 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 215–218. 
261. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
1227, 1227–28 (2016). 
262. See Teresa Scassa, The Best Things in Law Are Free?: Towards Quality Free Public Access 
to Primary Legal Materials in Canada, 23 DALHOUSIE L.J. 301, 329–35 (2000); Mark Adler, The 
Plain Language Movement, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LANGUAGE & LAW 67 (Peter M. Tiersma 
& Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012); Kirsten Wurmann, Public Legal Education Bibliography, 34 CAN. 
L. LIBR. REV. 232, 232 (2009). 
263. Contra David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65 VAND. L. REV. 
677, 701 (2012) (arguing that unregistered patents are unnecessary because rational inventors will 
always file for protection when their inventions warrant it). 
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III. PROPOSALS FOR REMEDYING THE PATENT CRISIS AND 
THE DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS: UNREGISTERED PATENT 
RIGHTS 
The authors of this Article have previously proposed a new, 
unregistered patent regime as a means of addressing the distributive 
effects of the patent registration system, but this approach would also be 
useful as an alternative to the current one-size-fits-all registered patent 
regime to address the patent crisis as well. Specifically, the limited scope 
and relative brevity of these unregistered rights offer a more efficient and 
less costly form of protection for low-value and low-investment 
inventions by curbing the excesses of the existing registered right system. 
The registered patent system would otherwise continue to be favored in 
most regards, as patent registration and examination serve a number of 
vital functions. Given the significant flaws of the current one-size-fits-all 
approach to patenting, however, an unregistered rights regime would 
serve a vital function as well. 
To recapitulate the authors’ previous proposal, the unregistered patent 
system would be an amendment to the current Patent Act264 modeled after 
the E.U.’s unregistered industrial design protection scheme.265 Protection 
would be subject to meeting the same substantive requirements applied in 
the current registered patents regime, including subject matter eligibility, 
novelty, utility, and nonobviousness, but any invention that satisfies those 
requirements would automatically become protected as soon as it 
becomes publicly available. Public availability would be defined in much 
the same way as it is under the current Patent Act: that is, public 
description in enabling detail, patenting in another country, public use, 
offers for sale, or any other disclosure to the public.266 For a process 
invention, public availability would also include public disclosure of 
products affected by use of the process. In suing for infringement of their 
rights, unregistered patentees therefore would have to establish their 
priority date by proving the date on which their inventions became public. 
Upon attaching, unregistered patent rights would protect against 
making, using, selling, or offering to sell only knowing and direct copies 
of the subject invention. Patentees seeking to enforce their rights therefore 
would also have the burden to prove that the alleged infringers actually 
 
264. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390. 
265. Council Regulation 6/2002, art. 11(1), 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC); see also Charles-Henry Massa 
& Alain Strowel, Community Design: Cinderella Revamped, 2003 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 68, 74 
(providing and overview of the regulation). 
266. See Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 628, 634 (2019); 
Metallizing Eng’g Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1946).  
Marcowitz-Bitton and Michiko Morris (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:51 PM 
1872 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1835 
 
copied their inventions. The proposed rights would thus be quite limited 
in scope as compared to registered patent rights. Limiting infringement to 
knowing copies also simplifies the infringement analysis somewhat. 
Litigation over unregistered rights would not have the benefit of the 
peripheral claiming system, under which registered patentees must limn 
the boundaries of their inventions with written “claims” that “particularly 
point[] out and distinctly claim[]” the invention.267 With unregistered 
rights, on the other hand, downstream inventors and courts are left only 
with what is more akin to the former central claiming system, under which 
infringement suits would have had to rely on equivalence between the 
allegedly infringing device and any examples of the patented invention 
described in the patent.268 In adjudicating infringement of unregistered 
patents, however, courts would at least have evidence that the defendant 
actually copied the subject invention. 
And while any reversion to a more central-claiming approach may 
seem to introduce greater unpredictability and higher information costs, it 
is not clear that the central claiming system is significantly more 
unpredictable than the peripheral claiming system, however.269 Modern-
day patent claims are notoriously difficult to interpret,270 and in any event 
patent law frequently depends on unstructured comparisons between 
technologies to measure things like novelty and nonobviousness.271 
Moreover, although the central-claiming approach means that 
unregistered protections would extend to not only identical copies but also 
those that are effectively equivalent to the subject invention, the proposed 
unregistered rights in practice would not be appreciably broader than 
registered patent rights. While registered patents usually protect against 
only infringement literally identical to the claimed invention, registered 
patentees typically claim their inventions broadly to include as many 
variations on, or “embodiments” of, their inventions as possible.272 
 
267. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). 
268. See ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 651, 711 (7th ed. 2017); Martin J. Adelman, Patent Claiming in the United States: 
Central, Peripheral, or Mongrel?, 1 IP THEORY 71, 72–75 (2010). 
269. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1747, 1751–61 (2009). 
270. Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925, 925 (2018). 
271. Burk & Lemley, supra note 269, at 1758. The central claiming analysis is similar to what 
courts continue to do under the doctrine of equivalents (DOE) approach to construing patent claims 
in the peripheral claiming system. Id. at 1763 (noting that although the DOE is arguably more 
structured than infringement analyses under a central-claiming system, both methods look at the “gist” 
of the underlying invention to determine infringement).  
272. See generally Adelman, supra note 268, at 72–75 (comparing and contrasting peripheral and 
central claiming systems). 
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Allowing unregistered protection against substantially similar copies of 
their inventions thus would likely cover only that which would otherwise 
have been claimed through registration. Independent creation would 
always be an absolute defense to infringement of such unregistered patent 
rights, moreover. 
For much the same reasons, the proposed unregistered patent regime 
would not have much effect on the public-notice function of patent 
registration. A common complaint about the registered patent system is 
that in practice it has proven less than effective in giving notice to others. 
Inventors and others in science and technology often do not read patents 
for fear of being accused of willful infringement,273 and even if they did, 
the clearance costs of identifying and reviewing all of the patents relevant 
to one’s research project can often be astronomical.274 By contrast, the 
simple act of copying another’s invention would put copyists on notice 
that they might be infringing (unregistered or registered) patents, lowering 
their information costs in many if not most cases below those of other 
alleged infringers (because registered patents protect not only against 
copying but also against independent creation). Downstream inventors 
would have to examine the inventions they copy to verify the date the 
inventions became public, and this is not always simple or inexpensive, 
especially if the inventor’s identity is not readily apparent. Discovering 
exactly when an invention became public, however, is likely no more 
difficult than determining the effective date of prior art that can be used 
to invalidate an issued patent;275 both inquiries depend on determining 
when previous technology became “public.” 
Returning to the structure of the proposed new regime, unregistered 
patent rights holders would be entitled to a presumption of validity, 
resembling that which registered patent holders enjoy, but rebuttable by a 
mere preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing 
evidence.276 The alleged infringers would thus have the opportunity to 
challenge the validity of the unregistered rights under a significantly lower 
standard, reflecting the fact that the rights would not have been vetted by 
a patent office.277 Despite the lack of vetting, however, allowing 
unregistered patent holders at least this lower-level presumption of 
 
273. Lemley, supra note 150, at 1510 n.63. 
274. See generally Christina Mulligan & Timothy B. Lee, Scaling the Patent System, 68 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 289 (2012) (calculating patent clearance costs). 
275. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 14.  
276. 35 U.S.C. § 282. 
277. See id. (awarding presumption of validity to issued patents); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 
564 U.S. 91, 97–98 (2011) (noting that section 282 has long been interpreted as requiring clear and 
convincing evidence to rebut presumption that PTO correctly issued a patent). 
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validity would save them the additional costs and time of proving validity, 
thereby avoiding the additional costs of patent searches and so on to their 
overall enforcement costs. Indeed, defendants often are able to find 
invalidating prior art references more easily than even a patent office 
can.278 Having defendants proceed immediately to their invalidity 
arguments, rather than forcing patentees to provide validity first, may lead 
to faster and less costly disposition of infringement proceedings. The 
presumption of validity even for unregistered patent rights is in this way 
important to the cost-reducing objective of the proposed system. 
Similar to unregistered industrial design rights,279 moreover, the 
proposed unregistered patent protections would last for only three years 
from the first publication of the invention. Inventors would remain 
eligible to apply for registered patent protections but would have to file 
within one year of the date on which the invention was first made public. 
Inventors who do not file patent applications within one year of the time 
their inventions become public would forfeit issued patent protection 
altogether, leaving them with only the remaining two years of their 
unregistered patent rights. 
This provision is consistent with the existing U.S. patent system’s one-
year grace period for novelty for inventors that publicly disclose their 
inventions prior to filing under section 102(b) of the AIA. The AIA 
declares that any disclosure of an invention prior to the date on which the 
patent application on it is filed bars the invention from patent eligibility 
for lack of novelty. The exception to this rule is disclosure of the invention 
by its own inventors, as long as they disclose no more than one year before 
they file their application. More to the point, this grace period establishes 
an effective “first-to-file-or-first-to-publicly-disclose” system, in which 
such self-disclosure of an invention allows its inventor to set a de facto 
priority date by pre-empting any later third-party disclosures that could 
disprove the novelty of the invention.280 Allowing inventors to establish 
 
278. In the vast majority of cases, issued patents are invalidated based on defendant-identified prior 
art previously unseen by the USPTO. Stephen Yelderman, Prior Art in the District Court, 95 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 837, 883–84 (2019); Shine Tu, Invalidated Patents and Associated Patent Examiners, 
18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 135, 159–61 (2015). 
279. Several jurisdictions offer protection for new unregistered industrial designs once they 
become publicly available. Most prominent of these protections is in the European Union, which 
protects unregistered designs under the Community Design Regulation (CDR). Council Regulation 
6/2002, art. 11(1), 2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC); see also Massa & Strowel, supra note 265, at 74 (providing 
and overview of the regulation). This regulation protects an unregistered design for a period of three 
years from the date it first was made available to the public in a way that specialists in the relevant 
sector could be reasonably assumed to know of the design. Council Regulation 6/2002, art. 11(1), 
2002 O.J. (L 3) 1 (EC). To be eligible for protection, a design must be new and of individual character 
over prior designs. Id. 
280. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 268, at 390–91. 
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priority in this way gives both registered and unregistered rights holders 
the incentive to disclose their inventions publicly as soon as possible. 
Almost all countries allow inventors to disclose their inventions publicly 
up to a year before filing without anticipating themselves or otherwise 
being barred from patent eligibility.281 This one-year grace period would 
not give inventors much time to prepare and file their patent application, 
but it does at least provide both registered and unregistered rights holders 
the right to prevent others from copying their inventions during that time. 
And if inventors do opt to file for registered rights, they would not 
automatically be entitled to registered patent rights, even if their 
unregistered patent rights were found to be valid by a court of law. Full 
examination with the patent office would ensure that the patent office 
maintains authority to issue registered patents. Nonetheless, the proposed 
unregistered rights preserve the same twenty-one-year maximum 
effective duration of protection allowed under existing U.S. patent law. 
Granted, even under U.S. patent law, patentees cannot sue others for 
infringement occurring in that first pre-filing year, the way they would be 
able to under the proposal here.282 That being said, under both systems, an 
inventor who applies for registered patent rights within a year of publicly 
disclosing their invention can force others to wait to practice the invention 
until the twenty-first year after that initial pre-filing disclosure. 
A. Distributive Effects Under an Unregistered Patent System 
As the authors have written elsewhere, one of the major benefits of the 
proposed two-tiered regime is that it would offer automatic patent rights 
without the need for a lengthy, costly, and often biased registration 
process. Unregistered rights would thus offer a toe-hold to inventors such 
as women and racial and ethnic minorities, who are often effectively 
excluded from the current system. Moreover, unregistered rights require 
no awareness or motivation to file, compensating for the fact that 
disadvantaged inventors do not have access to the kind of guidance and 
legal expertise that other patentees have. The broader effect of 
unregistered rights could thus provide disadvantaged inventors with better 
economic leverage and lead to changes in perception of innovation by 
women and racial minorities. 
The potential investors would also have more incentives to invest in the 
subject inventions, as investors would have the assurance that the 
 
281. WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., CERTAIN ASPECTS OF NATIONAL/REGIONAL PATENT LAWS 
(2019),  https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/national_laws/grace_period.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q2MS-V9UQ].  
282. 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)(2). 
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inventions are protected automatically for at least three years. Of course, 
unregistered patents would be much shorter in duration than registered 
patents and would not benefit from the USPTO’s imprimatur of validity 
or a presumption of validity rebuttable only by clear and convincing 
evidence. Once they make their inventions public, however, unregistered 
patent owners effectively establish priority for themselves should they opt 
to apply for registered rights within the one-year grace period allowed 
under U.S. patent law.283 This combination of three years of unregistered 
protection and priority in filing for the more robust protections of a 
registered patent could provide investors with the strong positive signals 
that they want. And even issued patents have only probabilistic validity 
under the clear and convincing evidence standard,284 and the U.S. Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals, has become notorious for disagreeing with the 
USPTO and the lower courts on questions of patent validity and scope.285 
Investing in unregistered patents therefore may not be significantly riskier 
than investing in registered patents. 
To be sure, when rights are unregistered, their acknowledgement and 
enforcement is transferred to the courts, replacing one human agent with 
another one. Human intervention is not eliminated altogether but rather is 
replaced. Yet, courts are more committed to due process than 
administrative agencies,286 as agencies lack many of the procedural justice 
and due process constraints to which courts must adhere.287 The judiciary 
also are unlikely to suffer from the same biases as those in many 
technological fields or to have any associative connections with, or 
favorable inclinations toward, those who work in those fields;288 the 
USPTO, by contrast, draw their examiners from science and 
 
283. See supra text accompanying notes 280–281. 
284. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSPS. 75, 75–76 (2005). 
285. See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction 
Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 259 (2008). 
286. See A. Dan Tarlock, Administrative Law: Procedural Due Process and Other Issues, 56 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 13, 13–14 (1980); Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like 
Legislatures and Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 80–84 (2007).  
287. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Taming the Tail That Wags the Dog: Ex Post and Ex Ante 
Constraints on Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (2004). 
288. See Martin H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and the 
Administrative State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 298 (2018). But see Adrian Vermeule, Essay, 
Deference and Due Process, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1928–29 (2016) (arguing that agency 
motivation seldom affects decision-making). 
Marcowitz-Bitton and Michiko Morris  (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:51 PM 
2020] UNREGISTERED PATENTS 1877 
 
technology.289 Judges are subject to their own biases,290 but granting rights 
automatically ex ante, without agency intervention, and then allowing 
courts to adjudicate the validity of those rights ex post may help protect 
against bias. 
Of course, enforcement costs even for unregistered rights could still be 
exorbitant. While rights holders under both regimes would have to incur 
significant costs when later attempting to enforce those rights, at least 
under the unregistered regime they would not have to face the often 
prohibitively high costs for obtaining those rights at the outset. And while 
the value of investing in obtaining protection for an invention is often 
speculative at best, once the invention has been copied, the value of 
investing in enforcing rights against copying the invention becomes less 
speculative. Even inventors who are not aware of their rights will be more 
motivated to learn about them and enforce them once infringement is 
detected. 
B. The Patent Crisis Under an Unregistered Patent System 
New to the proposal here is the surprising fact that, in addition to 
mitigating the underprotection of disadvantaged inventors, an 
unregistered patents regime could also mitigate the overprotections that 
underlie the current patent crisis. An unregistered patent alternative could 
be used to channel more trivial innovations—as measured in terms of low 
investment or low social value—away from the full-blown protections of 
the registered patent system, thereby mitigating deadweight losses and the 
innovation stifling effects of anticommons and patent thickets. 
First, the proposed regime would mitigate the problem of deadweight 
loss associated with patent monopolies. Because patentees of low-
investment and low-value inventions would be entitled to protection only 
against direct copying of their inventions, independent creators of the 
same inventions would be able to compete down the prices the patentees 
can charge. Likewise, the inventions would be protected for only a short 
term, limiting the duration of the patentees’ ability to charge 
supracompetitive prices, even if there are no independent creators to 
 
289. Redish & McCall, supra note 288, at 307–08 (noting that “biased assimilation” makes people 
more “likely to credit or dismiss evidence or argument selectively based on how it conforms to their 
group, belief, or position”). And while administrative agency discretion is subject to judicial review, 
this review often tends to be deferential. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) 
(holding that Administrative Procedures Act generally requires judicial deference to agency findings 
of fact); Krotoszynski, supra note 287, at 1060 (describing judicial review of agency decisions as an 
“imperfect mechanism for ensuring fair process in the first instance”). 
290. Thomas W. Merrill, Fair and Impartial Adjudication, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 897, 897 
(2019) (noting possibility of biases in courts as well as agencies). 
Marcowitz-Bitton and Michiko Morris (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:51 PM 
1878 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1835 
 
create a more competitive market. 
Second, the proposed regime would attenuate the effects of both the 
anticommons and patent thicket phenomena. If registered protection is 
reserved mainly for inventors of high-quality, high-investment inventions, 
and low-value and low-investment inventions are relegated to 
unregistered rights, the overall patent burden will be greatly reduced, in 
turn reducing the chances for anticommons and patent thickets. Again, the 
proposed unregistered patent rights limit infringement liability to those 
who copy, not to those who independently create, thereby creating a safe 
harbor for most potential patent infringers, given that those sued for 
infringement are most often independent creators who just happened to be 
second-in-time.291 Although copyists may be overdeterred, copying in 
itself provides little social value other than lowering prices by free riding 
on others’ inventive efforts. Unlike the registered patent system, 
moreover, the proposed regime would not impose treble damages for 
knowing infringement.292 Competitors therefore would have even less 
incentive to turn a blind eye to the latest developments in their field to 
avoid claims of copying. 
Additionally, unlike unregistered copyright, trade secrecy, or 
trademark protections, the proposed unregistered patent rights would last 
for only three years. This creates another significant safe harbor for those 
who wait before copying another’s invention and greatly reduces the 
window in which they would face the risk of patent trolling, nuisance 
suits, thickets, and holdouts. The ability of patentees to extract excessive 
royalties and hold out would be significantly reduced under an 
unregistered patent regime, and, as a result, the effects of anticommons 
tragedies or patent thickets would be very limited. To illustrate this, 
consider again the situation in which several patentees hold patent rights 
on different components that are necessary inputs for the production of a 
single product. With both the limited scope and limited duration of their 
rights, these patentees would have limited power to hold out and extort 
rents from the producer.293 
Finally, were patentees provided with a limited form of patent 
protection that coincides with their low-investment and low-value 
inventions, as we proposed here, inventors would have a greater incentive 
to engage in complex, expensive, and, most importantly, valuable 
inventive activities. They will also have an incentive to engage in less 
valuable activities as well under the proposed model because they still 
 
291. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE 123–24 (2008). 
292. THOMAS F. COTTER, COMPARATIVE PATENT REMEDIES: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
23 (2013).  
293. See supra Part II. 
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would be awarded fairly and receive adequate compensation for those 
efforts. The proposed two-tiered patent regime in this way would be more 
consistent with the IP clause of the U.S. Constitution because it would 
help promote progress in the useful arts. 
That being said, how to convince inventors who have the resources to 
apply for registered patent protections to nonetheless settle for the lesser 
protections of unregistered patents is key. The availability of automatic 
protections under the unregistered patent scheme would encourage many 
inventors of low-value, low-investment patents to elect that alternative 
just as creators often do under copyright and trademark law, effectively 
weeding out such inventions from registration-based route of protection. 
Many technologies like computer software and electronics do not need a 
full twenty years of patent protection, as their product development and 
market cycles are brief and rapid.294 Three years of protection against 
copying under the proposed unregistered patent rights could be more than 
enough to recoup investments in these industries, particularly if the 
underlying invention is of high commercial value. Inventors therefore 
might voluntarily opt for the immediate protections of unregistered patent 
rights. Saving the not insignificant expense and delays of applying for 
registered patent protection also could yield greater returns on their 
investments. In this way, the proposed system would naturally channel 
some types of invention toward this less costly scheme of protection. 
For a great number of inventors, however, uncertainty about their 
inventions’ life cycles and the desire to maximize revenues would 
presumably drive them to opt for twenty years of full patent rights. This 
Article accordingly proposes a number of “sticks” to impel inventors 
toward the unregistered rights regime, similar to the kinds of constraints 
also seen to some extent in the two-tiered regimes in copyright and 
trademark law as well, and for many of the same reasons. One of the 
authors of this Article has previously suggested one such measure, for 
example: creating a new patentability requirement that inventors disclose 
at least some credible evidence of the R&D investment needed for the 
subject invention.295 This evidence would comprise state and federal 
 
294. Verne A. Luckow & Steven C. Balsarotti, Statistical Analysis of Federal District Court Cases 
Seeking Longer Patent Term Adjustments in the Wake of Wyeth v. Kappos, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 3 (2010).  
295. Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton, Yotam Kaplan & Maayan Perel, Recoupment Patent, 98 N.C. L. 
REV. 481, 519–20 (2020).  
Marcowitz-Bitton and Michiko Morris (Do Not Delete) 12/14/2020  10:51 PM 
1880 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1835 
 
income tax filings,296 SEC filings,297 publicly traded companies’ 
regulatory reporting schemes,298 private companies’ by-laws and 
reporting requirements,299 and so on. In the proposed two-tiered system, 
R&D investments that do not meet some minimum threshold level could 
then be disqualified from obtaining registered patent rights or—if less 
coercive measures were desirable—charged significantly higher filing 
fees. (Although this latter measure might effectively disqualify 
disadvantaged inventors who cannot afford higher filing fees, these 
inventors would still have their unregistered rights on which to fall back.) 
An even more administratively simple method would be a presumption 
of unregistrability for certain technologies such as business methods or 
computer software, which could funnel what are typically low-investment 
inventions of often dubious patentability into the unregistered rights 
regime. In many ways, this presumption would simply formalize what is 
now a general expectation that most business methods and software are 
unpatentable subject matter, but giving inventors in these fields the 
automatic option of unregistered rights could alleviate what has otherwise 
become a quagmire in the law on patentable subject matter. 
To alleviate the patent crisis in other ways, inventive entities who do 
not themselves practice their own inventions could be required to submit 
credible evidence of a good faith intent to license their patents to entities 
who would. This intent-to-license requirement would be similar to the 
intent-to-use requirement in trademark registration. Inventors who cannot 
produce such evidence could be denied registrability, and even inventors 
who do prove an intent to license could be required to sign a terminal 
disclaimer curtailing their registered rights if such licensing does not 
occur within a given period of time. Directing nonpracticing entities in 
this way toward the narrow scope and breadth of unregistered rights could 
help protect against abuse of registered rights by patent trolls to extort 
rents from unwitting infringers. 
It is easy to see the advantages of constraining low-investment, low-
value inventions to unregistered patent rights—again, these types of 
 
296. See generally Jeffrey A. Dubin & Louis L. Wilde, An Empirical Analysis of Federal Income 
Tax Auditing and Compliance, 41 NAT’L TAX J. 61 (1988) (discussing tax compliance issues and the 
effectiveness of tax filings, audits, and the IRS in ensuring accurate disclosure). 
297. On the significance of SEC filings, see generally Earl K. Stice, The Market Reaction to 10-K 
and 10-Q Filings and to Subsequent The Wall Street Journal Earnings Announcements, 66 ACCT. 
REV. 42 (1991). 
298. See Ray Ball, Infrastructure Requirements for an Economically Efficient System of Public 
Financial Reporting and Disclosure, in BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON FINANCIAL SERVICES: 
2001, 127, 127 (Robert E. Litan & Richard J. Herring eds., 2001). 
299. See id. (sketching “the principal infrastructure requirements for an economically efficient 
system of public financial report[s]” and disclosure). 
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inventions do little to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”300 Low-
investment but high-value inventions, on the other hand, are still within 
the category of inventions the patent system should incentivize, but as 
noted above, these inventions will likely recoup their investments even 
with only unregistered rights. These inventions would still be protected 
for three years, which if they have value may be enough time for them to 
earn sufficient profits, and although they would also be protected against 
only copyists, not against independent creators, independent creation 
would suggest that these inventions would have been invented anyway 
without incentive of registered patent rights. And if an invention is of 
high-value, but low-investment, there is all the more reason to limit its 
protections in order to limit the potential for hindering others’ use of the 
invention, thereby lowering both deadweight losses and barriers to future 
innovation. 
Inventions that require high levels of investment, by contrast, would all 
receive full registered patent rights. Registered patent rights would still 
lead to deadweight losses and the potential to impede innovation by 
others, but again, for high-investment and high-quality inventions, this is 
still a worthwhile cost-benefit ratio.301 The one quadrant of inventions that 
may be troublesome under the proposed two-tiered regime is high-
investment but low-quality inventions, which can have a considerable 
effect on future innovation, particularly in complementary or cumulative 
technologies. On the one hand, if an invention has little or no social value, 
a registered patent on it is unlikely to incur much in deadweight losses. 
Similarly, if the invention has little or no technological value, registered 
rights pose less of a possibility of anticommons or patent thickets, 
particularly if meaningful alternatives to the invention are available. 
Nonetheless, registered patents on such inventions could pose a 
particularly dangerous potential for abuse against inadvertent infringers. 
Inventions of this type may be relatively few in number, however. 
Assuming that the level of monetary investment in an invention at least 
roughly correlates with the value of the invention, both socially and 
technologically, the high-investment but low-value invention will tend to 
be less common. Perhaps more importantly, assuming that inventors and 
those who fund them are rational, both will typically take pains to avoid 
investing heavily in inventions of low value, as the odds will be greater 
that the invention will never recoup their investment. High-investment but 
low-value inventions are therefore most likely to arise when inventors try 
 
300. See supra text accompanying note 145 (discussing the intellectual property clause, Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution). 
301. See supra text accompanying notes 159–179. 
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to salvage something patentable from an otherwise failed inventive effort. 
The value of an unregistered patent rights regime while maintaining the 
stronger incentives of registered rights for high-value and high-investment 
inventions becomes clear. This proposal can remedy, at least partially, the 
challenges posed by the one-size-fits-all patent regime and the distributive 
effects of registered patent regimes by providing easier access to patent 
protection. As patent law’s insistence on requiring registration likely 
contributes to distorted incentives for inventors of low-value and low-
investment inventions and to the gender, racial, ethnic and economic gap 
in patenting, an unregistered patent regime would go far in tailoring 
protection for both of these groups. Notably, the new regime would 
require periodic evaluation to measure how many low-value and low-
investment inventions rely on unregistered patents and to what extent gaps 
in patent filings persist in gender, racial, ethnic, and economic groups. 
And although it is not a comprehensive solution, which would require 
much more far-reaching changes to standards for patentability and in 
empowering women and disadvantaged minorities more generally, the 
proposed unregistered patent regime would serve as a significant measure 
and a more optimal scheme for incentivizing low-value and low-
investment inventions. 
IV. THE BENEFITS OF A TWO-TIERED PATENT MODEL 
Despite the large body of scholarship documenting both the patent 
crisis and the distributive effects of patent registration, the patent system 
has yet to implement reform proposals that can remedy or at least alleviate 
either of these problems. Unregistered patent rights could play a major 
role in this reform. Over the years, legal scholars also have proposed 
changes in judicial interpretation of legal patent doctrines, as well as other 
targeted solutions to nonpatent related challenges certain disadvantaged 
groups face.302 Many of the previous proposals, however, cannot easily be 
addressed or will take a lot of time and money to implement. Many also 
have proposed changing the design of the patent regime to remedy the 
problems from its one-size-fits-all nature, as well as the distributive 
effects of patent registration.303 Several of the proposed reforms, ranging 
 
302. See Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (with Special 
Reference to Coercion, Agency, and Development), 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 774–79 (2007).  
303. E.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 2–4; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 5, at 1, 4–6; 
Michael Abramowicz, Orphan Business Models: Toward a New Form of Intellectual Property, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1406–07 (2011); Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1747, 1761–62 (2011); Daniel R. Cahoy, An Incrementalist Approach to Patent Reform Policy, 
9 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 587, 635–36 (2006); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem 
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from moderate to comprehensive, seek to address the current patent crisis. 
Compared to the relatively streamlined two-tiered regime proposed here, 
however, the complexity of these latter proposals would be much more 
administratively burdensome and could lead to greater uncertainty in the 
patent system, undermining its effectiveness. 
Professors Bell and Parchomovsky, for instance, have introduced the 
idea of lowering deadweight losses by allowing patentees to choose what 
level of protection they receive in terms of rights granted, scope, and 
remedies.304 These different levels of protection would also entail 
different levels of patent fees to reflect the value of the rights sought. 
Inventors whose technologies are likely to have shorter effective 
commercial lives would be able to pay less in filing fees for a shorter 
patent term.305 Similarly, inventors who plan to use their patents mostly 
for licensing could pay fewer fees if they agreed to waive their rights to 
injunctive relief.306 Inventors who by contrast need longer effective patent 
lives or more robust rights would also have the choice to pay for greater 
levels of protection. By thus tailoring patent protections to the needs of 
the patentee, their suggested model would reduce associated deadweight 
losses.307 
Professors Bell and Parchomovsky’s proposal suffers from a number 
of salient problems, however. First, the model would be most costly and 
difficult to administer because it would necessitate the creation of not just 
two different types of patents but instead a whole panoply of patent 
categories and accompanying fees. It would also require inventors to 
predict how much patent scope and duration they would need to earn 
sufficient revenues. This calculation would be difficult in technologies 
with unpredictable market demand and would depend as well on 
predictions of post-patenting commercialization costs, which for 
technologies such as those that are science-based are also unpredictable. 
Second, the patentees’ absolute freedom to choose the desired length 
and scope of protection, which Bell and Parchomovsky view as one of the 
 
of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 847–49 (2006); Eric E. 
Johnson, Calibrating Patent Lifetimes, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 269, 290–93, 
297–300 (2006); Amir H. Khoury, Differential Patent Terms and the Commercial Capacity of 
Innovation, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 373, 407 (2010); Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 
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major advantages of their proposal,308 is also a major drawback. For well-
heeled patent holders and potential patent trolls, for example, a higher fee 
for broader protection may not be sufficiently threatening by itself to 
channel them toward lower protection levels. Patent trolls, for example, 
would continue to purchase higher levels of patent protection to extract 
excessive rents through aggressive litigation, as they do now. Unless the 
differentials in the patent fees are greater than present value of the 
additional revenues patent holders might earn from abusing higher levels 
of protection, applicants will elect stronger and longer patent rights. 
Without any objective guidelines or external review, a nonregulated, self-
tailored regime of patent protection can easily miss its goals. 
Third, and much more important to the analysis in this Article, Bell and 
Parchomovsky’s self-tailored regime may disfavor less well-heeled and 
experienced powerful inventors. On the one hand, their model would do 
nothing to help disadvantaged inventors who are already discouraged 
from seeking patent rights by the current costs of registration and 
examination. Indeed, their model could serve to aggravate the distributive 
effects of patent registration. Inventors may be forced to agree to less 
protection than they need to recoup their initial investment costs if they 
cannot afford the higher fees associated with this protection, particularly 
if those fees are set at levels high enough to deter patent trolling. Hence, 
Bell and Parchomovsky’s model could effectively impair deserving but 
disadvantaged inventors without having any meaningful effect on patent 
abuse. This in turn would inefficiently reduce incentives to invent and 
would slow technological progress. 
Professors Burk and Lemley, by contrast, suggest a technology-specific 
system of patent protection,309 adding to the growing body of technology-
specific patent reform proposals.310 Burk and Lemley suggest that courts 
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vary their application of patentability doctrines according to the 
technological field and industry to which an invention belongs.311 Using 
the software and biotechnology industries to demonstrate this concept, 
Burk and Lemley argue that courts frequently (but perhaps unwittingly) 
use the “person having ordinary skill in the art” standard common to many 
patent law doctrines to tailor patent scope.312 They therefore advocate 
more explicitly for use of patentability standards to help tailor what is 
otherwise the one-size-fits-all nature of the patent system.313 
As useful as more nuanced patentability doctrines may be in improving 
patent quality and fit, however, Burk and Lemley’s patent system still 
relies on a binary, full-patent-rights or no-patent-rights approach that both 
underprotects and overprotects. While Burk and Lemley are clearly 
correct in their observation that we can, in a general sense, characterize 
the overarching differences between different fields of technology, the 
inventions within a specific field of technology are hardly monolithic in 
their characteristics.314 The two-tiered regime proposed in this Article 
therefore takes a more fine-grained approach that distinguishes between 
individual inventions themselves rather than merely between individual 
industries. This approach is also easier to administer, as characterizing 
individual inventions based on the information applicants supply is much 
cheaper and easier than attempting to characterize entire industries and 
how patent protection affects them.315 Furthermore, Burk and Lemley’s 
patent system allows patentees to try to game the system by strategically 
drafting their patent applications to fit the categories of technology they 
perceive to be more advantageous.316 
Professor Roin has also proposed a tailored patent system similar to, 
but less discretionary than Bell and Parchomovsky’s model.317 Noting that 
certain inventions have longer development cycles and take longer to 
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reach the market than others,318 Roin argues that longer patent terms 
would better reward such inventions without stifling other innovations in 
the same field because of their similarly longer development cycles.319 He 
also posits that an invention’s time-to-market also reliably indicates its 
R&D costs, its risk of failure in R&D, its anticipated future revenue 
streams, and its potential for imitation by rivals.320 Roin therefore also 
stands for the proposition that “inventions’ time-to-market strongly 
correlates with optimal patent strength.”321 
Like the proposals mentioned above, however, Professor Roin’s 
proposed system poses some problems. Assuming that Roin is correct that 
an invention’s time-to-market accurately indicates R&D investment, risk, 
and likelihood of returns, calculating time-to-market is fairly 
straightforward. Roin neglects the possibility, however, that some 
inventions may have longer times-to-market not because of the invention 
itself, which may have required relatively little investment, but because of 
external factors, such as development of complementary or cumulative 
technologies or the need to develop other infrastructure (think of biofueled 
cars and their dependence on an infrastructure of biofueling stations). 
These same issues plague the use of so-called secondary or objective 
factors, such as commercial success or long-felt need, in nonobviousness 
analyses; although an invention may be a commercial success or may 
respond to a long-felt need—or, as in Roin’s system, may take longer to 
reach the market—this may be due to economic or other factors rather 
than the technological merits of the invention itself. 
Professor Perel has also proposed a novel method of patent valuation 
for licensing purposes.322 Her suggestion is that patent value should 
correlate with the social and technological contribution of an invention 
based on exhaustive analysis of how well the invention fits the 
patentability requirements, its prospective uses, the degree to which it 
relied on patent incentives, and so on.323 Based on this analysis, the 
inventor would then be granted a patent that could be licensed only within 
a prescribed range of prices.324 This would on the one hand encourage 
more investment in high-quality innovation and on the other hand set ex 
ante limitations on licensing fees to deter patent trolling and minimize the 
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effect of bargaining leverage during licensing negotiations. This in turn 
would hamper patentees’ ability to hold up subsequent innovation and 
impede future research and perhaps thereby also reduce litigation costs 
and litigation rates.325 
While Professor Perel’s suggestion is in many ways ideal for matching 
the costs of patent protection with its benefits, it would be extremely 
costly and difficult—if not in fact impossible—to administer. Moreover, 
her proposal is limited to licensing and would not affect a patentee’s 
ability to price its own market products and services supracompetitively 
or the deadweight losses caused as a result. Important for the purposes of 
this Article, moreover, inventors would still have to undergo registration 
and examination in order to obtain patent rights, and with the 
exponentially more intensive examination that would be required under 
Perel’s system, registration and examination costs could be astronomical. 
Perel’s proposal therefore could easily exacerbate the distributive effects 
of the patent system. 
As mentioned above, another proposal made by one of the authors of 
this Article introduces a new “recoupment patent” regime.326 Professor 
Marcowitz-Bitton and her co-authors advocate replacing the current one-
size-fits-all model with an approach that offers different periods and 
different levels of protection based on the specific level of investment 
made in any given invention. Under this recoupment patent model, patent 
protection would expire once the investment is recouped and a fixed 
percentage of profit is earned. Filing and renewal fees will also be 
calculated based on documented investment. Additionally, investment 
will serve as a basis for calculating royalties (or damages in subsequent 
litigation). This regime would more accurately incentivize innovation 
while avoiding the excessive protection under the current one-size-fits-all 
system. Like other proposals for tailored systems, however, this 
recoupment regime would raise administration and examination costs 
considerably, which in turn may worsen distributive effects. 
A very different line of proposals is to supplement or even replace the 
patent system with prizes and rewards.327 For example, Professors Shavell 
and van Ypersele described a prize system that inventors could opt into 
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by waiving their patent rights,328 and Professor Kremer proposed a similar 
system in which patent recipients would agree to give up their patents in 
exchange for compensation that would be determined through a unique 
auction process.329 While prizes and rewards have long been discussed as 
an alternative to the unitary nature of the patent system, there is also broad 
agreement that prize and reward systems would present quite thorny 
problems of administration.330 Systems that allowed inventors to choose 
between prizes or patents, for example, would have to be protected against 
political influence and agency capture. Prizes based on social value of an 
invention, such as that proposed by Shavell and van Ypersle, would face 
the difficulty of measuring social value, particularly in unpredictable or 
new technologies, and in any event there is plenty of debate about whether 
inventors should be able to appropriate the full social value of their 
contributions. Professor Lichtman, on the other hand, proposes a way of 
achieving the benefits of a prize system without its costs by retaining 
patent protections but subsidizing consumers who might be priced out of 
the market as a result.331 While avoiding the administrative costs of prize 
systems, however, Lichtman’s proposal merely substitutes them with the 
administrative costs of calculating appropriate consumer subsidies and 
how to allocate them. 
A discussion of all of the different alternatives to the unitary regime of 
the current patent system is beyond the scope and space limits of this 
Article. The analysis in this Part does at least, however, provide a broad 
sense of how the two-tiered patent regime proposed in this Article 
compares to other such proposals. In doing so, this Part also illustrates the 
advantages of such a two-tiered regime and its relative simplicity and yet 
comprehensive effect. A two-tiered regime that allows for both full 
registered patent rights where warranted and more limited but automatic 
unregistered rights where necessary would go far to reduce the distributive 
effects of the existing system while simultaneously relieving the effects 
of the patent crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article proposes a novel model for patent protection designed to 
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overcome the epidemic of low-quality patents and the crisis it has 
generated, as well as to offset gender, ethnic, racial, economic, and other 
gaps in patenting. To remedy these problems, this Article advocates the 
implementation of an unregistered patent regime that would grant patent 
protection automatically, without the various costs imposed by the current 
registered rights regime. As noted above, copyright and trademark law 
both offer two avenues of protection, one for registered rights and another 
for unregistered rights.332 Only patent law remains a holdout in requiring 
registration to obtain protection, despite the fact that many inventions do 
not require twenty years of registered patent protection and the fact that 
many female and disadvantaged inventors are disproportionately less 
likely to apply for or receive patent protection.333 
Although this unregistered patent regime could not by itself solve the 
patent crisis and achieve gender, ethnic, racial, and economic parity in 
patenting, this model’s relaxation of the registration requirement, together 
with the safeguards the proposed regime introduces, is a step in the right 
direction to expedite the registration of high-value inventions while 
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